Strategic encirclement, shattered air cover, and political paralysis erase Western narratives of control.
The Ukrainian military position has deteriorated to a point where political narrative no longer conceals operational collapse. Ukrainian officials have acknowledged that interception rates of MIM-104 Patriot systems against Russian missiles have dropped to a level so low that it has stripped the leadership of the ability to mask reality. Independent military observers such as Brian Berletic, Jacques Baud and Scott Ritter have stated for more than a year that Western air defence systems were structurally unfit to counter Russian hypersonic and ballistic capabilities at scale in a sustained war. Ukrainian reliance on these systems reflected political calculations rather than military logic. This collapse of air defence has produced strategic consequences that are not reversible through rhetorical assurances.
Russian control of the skies now shapes every dimension of the war, including Ukrainian logistics, force mobility and the survivability of urban centres. Evacuation plans for Kyiv and other major cities are under discussion because there is no credible capability remaining to intercept Russian strikes consistently. Russian missile production remains ahead of Western resupply rates, and Ukrainian infrastructure cannot sustain prolonged exposure to such pressure. Analysts like Alexander Mercouris have observed that once air defence collapses, ground positions quickly lose coherence because resupply becomes impossible under drone and missile dominance. This principle is now unfolding in eastern Ukraine in full operational clarity.
The battle for Pokrovsk illustrates this structural collapse. Russian forces have methodically severed all primary supply roads into the city, creating a situation in which Ukrainian formations are now trapped inside a tightening pocket. Satellite imagery, drone footage and independent mapping projects corroborate the destruction of Ukrainian supply convoys at road junctions north and west of the city. Jacques Baud and Douglas Macgregor have described Russian operational planning as focused on creating cauldrons, in which Ukrainian forces bleed out without large scale armoured engagements. Pokrovsk represents a larger version of earlier operations at Mariupol and Bakhmut, but with more troops trapped and less possibility of relief.
Ukrainian forces north-east of Pokrovsk have been depleted through repeated failed counterattacks ordered by Zelensky and Sirsky. These operations were conducted to sustain the political narrative of control rather than to achieve operational advantage. Russian forces have thickened the encirclement over time, consolidating positions around the Pokrovska mine to the south-west. This mine represented one of the most fortified Ukrainian positions in the sector. Its capture eliminates any realistic chance of Ukrainian breakout through prepared defensive positions. Analysts such as Scott Ritter have compared this emerging pocket to encirclements of the Second World War, where command refusal to retreat guaranteed catastrophic loss of entire formations.
Estimates of Ukrainian troop numbers trapped in Pokrovsk vary, but multiple brigades are inside the pocket. The only theoretical escape route runs across open fields under Russian drone surveillance and precision strike coverage. Any breakout attempt would inflict severe losses on already exhausted formations. Political refusal to order withdrawal has frozen the situation in a position from which Ukrainian forces can no longer manoeuvre. Scott Ritter and Brian Berletic have warned repeatedly that such politically imposed static defence positions would collapse once Russian forces completed operational encirclement. That prediction has now materialised with full force.
Encirclement is not confined to Pokrovsk. In Kupiansk, independent observers estimate that between five hundred and seven hundred Ukrainian troops are already trapped in the urban centre, with several thousand more east of the Oskol River. The seasonal shift to colder temperatures increases the danger of crossing the river, while Russian drones maintain continuous surveillance. These troops have no secure logistical corridor remaining. Russian control of the western bank prevents any organised withdrawal. Analysts like Andrei Martyanov and Larry Johnson have described this as the inevitable outcome of defending exposed positions without secure flanking supply routes.
Siversk faces a similar pattern. Russian troops have entered the city and secured control over surrounding supply routes. Ukrainian forces depend on long exposed road corridors that Russian artillery and drones can target at will. Military analysis from the Royal United Services Institute has underlined the efficiency of Russian integration of drone reconnaissance with artillery fire, which has created lethal transit corridors. Ukrainian forces cannot sustain long-term defence in such conditions. Resupply becomes an exercise in attrition rather than reinforcement, and attrition favours Russian capabilities.
Ukrainian authorities have already ordered the evacuation of civilians from Slavyansk, a decision that confirms their understanding of the deteriorating frontline. Slavyansk and Kramatorsk are anchor points for the Ukrainian defensive grid in Donbas. Their fall would destabilise the entire northern sector, forcing a rushed repositioning that Ukrainian forces likely cannot execute effectively under Russian pressure. Analysts such as Colonel Markus Reisner of the Austrian Armed Forces have stated that Ukrainian defensive depth in Donbas is shallow and brittle. The fall of Pokrovsk will likely trigger rapid collapse across a broad front.
Zelensky and Sirsky have refused timely withdrawals for political reasons. They have calculated that loss of ground undermines international support. Their strategy prioritises external political optics over operational sustainability. Independent analysts like Ivan Katchanovski of University of Ottawa have described this strategy as a political posture disconnected from military realities. The result is not strategic delay but mass encirclement. Ukrainian brigades face annihilation or forced surrender, neither of which serves long-term national defence interests.
The failure of Ukrainian air defence has enabled Russia to sustain pressure without incurring major casualties. Technical analysts including Brian Baletic and Alexander Mercouris have documented the structural mismatch between Russian missile technologies and Western defence systems. The Patriot system was never designed to counter a combination of ballistic, hypersonic and swarm drone strikes at this scale. Once its performance fell below a minimal interception threshold, Ukrainian positions became indefensible against sustained aerial attack. Western media outlets have begun acknowledging this collapse, but acknowledgement does not produce capability.
The United States has floated the possibility of transferring BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missiles to Ukraine. This reflects a political rather than operational calculation. Deployment of these systems requires direct American involvement due to their launch complexity. Independent engineering analysts at the Black Mountain Substack group have detailed the absence of mobile ground launch platforms for Tomahawks, since the original systems were dismantled decades ago. Rebuilding such capacity would require years, not months. Ukrainian leaders treat the prospect as symbolic rather than immediately actionable. The battlefield will not wait for such projects.
Russian officials have stated clearly that Tomahawk deployment in Ukraine would trigger a diplomatic freeze with Washington. Analysts such as Dmitri Trenin have explained that this would lock U.S.-Russian relations into a hard confrontation that removes any remaining diplomatic flexibility. Russia would absorb the new threat into its existing strategic posture without altering its operational tempo. Russian ground dominance would remain intact, and escalation risks would increase without battlefield impact favourable to Ukraine.
The broader strategic pattern mirrors the Ukrainian theatre. Washington has attempted to negotiate truces with China and Iran while simultaneously escalating restrictions and covert pressure. This behaviour has produced no concessions and instead hardened opposing positions. The Chinese Ministry of Commerce has documented that tariff relief during the spring truce coincided with new export restrictions and shipping fees targeting Chinese-built vessels. Wang Dong of Peking University has described this pattern as American strategic arrogance. Beijing has responded by escalating its own tariff measures and export controls, demonstrating its intent to sustain a prolonged confrontation rather than negotiate under pressure.
China has targeted sectors that cut deep into American industrial foundations. Restrictions on rare earth exports and antitrust investigations into Qualcomm undermine the technological base of U.S. high-end manufacturing. Analysts at the Mercator Institute for China Studies have noted that U.S. firms such as Apple and Tesla depend heavily on Chinese manufacturing networks. Prolonged escalation therefore exposes structural vulnerabilities on the U.S. side. Beijing has calculated that Washington lacks the economic capacity to impose cost-free escalation indefinitely.
Iran has followed a parallel logic. After the re-imposition of snapback sanctions, Tehran suspended cooperation with International Atomic Energy Agency entirely. Analysts like Seyed Mohammad Marandi of University of Tehran have described this as a direct response to perceived American duplicity. Washington negotiated temporary ceasefire frameworks, then applied renewed pressure once they were signed. Tehran has concluded that negotiation produces strategic disadvantage. This conclusion mirrors calculations in Beijing and Moscow.
The Russian position has hardened for similar reasons. Moscow engaged in exploratory discussions while observing continued U.S. involvement in Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian energy facilities. Analysts including Gilbert Doctorow have noted that this pattern convinced the Kremlin that Washington uses negotiations as covers for escalation rather than pathways to compromise. Russian operational superiority on the ground reduces any incentive to negotiate. Moscow views the conflict as existential, not transactional.
Washington has overestimated its leverage against major powers while underestimating their ability to coordinate. It maintains leverage over dependent states such as Israel but faces symmetrical or superior leverage from China, Russia and Iran. Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin hold secure domestic strategic positions that allow escalation without political fragmentation. Trump’s poker diplomacy has not softened adversaries but hardened them further. This dynamic is visible in the Sino-American trade war, the Iranian nuclear confrontation and the Ukrainian battlefield.
Ukraine has been forced into the centre of these structural failures. The collapse of Ukrainian defences is the consequence of political overreliance on Western support combined with systematic underestimation of Russian capacity. Analysts like Douglas Macgregor and Scott Ritter predicted this outcome once Russian industrial mobilisation surpassed Western resupply capacity. That mobilisation is now complete and visible. Russian output of drones, artillery shells and missiles exceeds the combined Ukrainian and Western supply streams. Ukrainian brigades face chronic ammunition shortages, while Russian forces maintain uninterrupted pressure.
Western systems have not reversed the balance. The failure of Patriot interceptors mirrors earlier failures of M1 Abrams and Leopard 2 tanks in the field. Russian drones and artillery have destroyed high-value Western equipment at scale. Analysts like Alex Vershinin of Royal United Services Institute have explained that these systems were designed for limited expeditionary wars under Western air dominance. They are not suited for attritional high-intensity combat against a peer adversary. Ukraine has no pathway to adapt them to this reality.
Russian strategy does not rely on spectacular breakthroughs. It relies on sustained logistical strangulation and controlled encirclements. Casualty ratios favour Russian forces because their operational method minimises exposure while maximising Ukrainian losses. Independent estimates by Jacques Baud and Scott Ritter indicate Ukrainian losses far exceed replacement capacity. Mobilisation fatigue is visible across Ukrainian society, and unit cohesion is eroding as losses accumulate without strategic gains.
Western political support continues rhetorically but material constraints are visible. European defence industries cannot match Russian production rates, and political divisions in the United States limit sustainable support. Analysts like George Beebe of Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft have argued that Washington faces a binary strategic choice between direct intervention or acceptance of Russian victory terms. Tomahawk delivery would constitute escalation but not reversal of battlefield conditions. Russian dominance would remain.
Russia will not negotiate on terms favourable to the United States. Its battlefield position is strong, its strategic alliances with China and Iran are consolidated, and its economy remains functional under sanctions. Chinese retaliation against American economic measures demonstrates Beijing’s willingness to sustain confrontation. Iranian disengagement shows Tehran’s readiness to harden its stance. These developments reduce the effectiveness of U.S. diplomatic pressure across multiple theatres simultaneously.
Ukrainian defeat is now moving from projection to structural reality. Russian forces are advancing towards the Dnieper, and Ukrainian positions in Donbas are collapsing under operational pressure. Air defence has failed, supply lines have broken, and Western weaponry has not changed the outcome. Political messaging from Kyiv has become disconnected from battlefield developments. Analysts such as Larry Johnson and Douglas Macgregor assess that the Ukrainian army may collapse entirely before the next campaign season if the current attrition continues.
The strategic trajectory is unambiguous as Ukraine is losing the war on every front that matters militarily. Russian forces are achieving their objectives through steady operational encirclement and air dominance. Western escalation options do not change the balance but increase strategic risks. Diplomatic bluff has produced hardened adversaries, not concessions. The war’s outcome will be shaped by Russian operational realities on the ground, not by political narratives in Western capitals.
The United States faces a critical decision between direct escalation or recalibration of strategy. Escalation through Tomahawk deployment would not reverse battlefield realities but would increase the probability of uncontrolled confrontation. Recalibration would acknowledge the limits of American leverage and the failure of bluff diplomacy. Neither path will recover the credibility already eroded, but continuation of the current posture guarantees further loss of strategic position.
The U.S. strategy of diplomatic bluff and incremental escalation has failed to deliver concessions from China, Iran or Russia. Each of these actors now escalates in direct response. This dynamic erodes American credibility and accelerates the formation of a hardened geopolitical bloc that rejects U.S. coercion. Multipolar alignment is now beyond theoretical; it is operational and coordinated in response to Washington’s miscalculations.
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