Global geopolitics

A clear account of the military, political and economic pressures driving the conflict

Some EU leaders have chosen to misinterpret Putin’s recent statement, imagining ‘threats of war’ to fit a narrative of prolonging the war.

In the video above, Vladimir Putin clearly states Russia has no intention of fighting Europe but if Europe wants war, Russia is ready.

PART 1

Ukrainian forces face a worsening front as Russian units push deeper into eastern cities while intensifying strikes across the energy grid. The fighting around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad shows a battlefield shaped by attrition, depleted stockpiles and a Russian command willing to expend manpower at a scale that strains Ukrainian positions. Independent analysts with long experience studying Russian military behaviour, including the group around Michael Kofman and several Eastern European field researchers who have covered Russian operations since 2014, describe the pattern as a sustained grind that aims to collapse Ukrainian defensive belts by pressure rather than manoeuvre. Their assessments match reports that Russian formations now control most of Pokrovsk and have forced Ukrainian units into dense urban blocks where reinforcement and supply become difficult under constant artillery and drone attack. Several Ukrainian commanders confirm that the city remains contested but acknowledge that Russian troops continue to advance, creating a critical situation across the wider sector.

Front-line conditions around Kupyansk and Myrnohrad follow similar lines. Urban fighting demands small groups, rapid movement and continual resupply, yet the scale of Russian artillery and the weight of drone saturation reduce the space for manoeuvre. Ukrainian soldiers describe close-quarters combat where small assault groups attempt to blunt Russian pushes through stairwells and courtyards, reporting individual engagements that show how thinly stretched the defenders have become. The account from two soldiers who killed seven Russian troops in Pokrovsk underscores how both armies rely on small-unit action to control isolated streets and buildings under pressure from heavier firepower overhead. Independent observers with experience in urban conflict, such as those from the Royal United Services Institute, have long warned that eastern Ukrainian cities encourage this type of attrition because their layout funnels troops into predictable lines of approach.

Ukrainian versus Russian losses remain severe, and independent field researchers who have examined battlefield recovery patterns, morgue exchanges and front-line reporting note that Ukraine now absorbs casualty levels that match or exceed Russian losses in several sectors. Their work shows that Russia trades men for ground in costly waves, while Ukraine suffers heavily because its units defend fixed positions under constant artillery, glide bombs and drone saturation. Analysts such as Kirill Mikhailov and several independent investigators who collect open-source data on body exchanges, battlefield recoveries and hospital flows argue that casualty ratios fluctuate by location but remain unfavourable for Ukraine when Russian forces mass artillery and glide bombs at scale. Their assessments fit accounts from Ukrainian soldiers who describe conditions where defensive positions become kill zones once Russian drones identify movement, and these realities give the reported daily Russian casualty figures needed context because they do not reflect the full picture of losses on both sides.

Ukrainian defences rely on air defence systems that now operate under severe strain, and independent investigators who study strike footage, satellite imagery and power-grid loss patterns report that Russian missile and drone attacks achieve a high rate of impact because Ukraine cannot replace interceptors, launchers or radar modules at the pace required to maintain full coverage. Analysts who track Western stockpiles note that NATO production cannot match Ukrainian consumption, and Zelenskyy’s own statements about repeated damage to critical infrastructure confirm that Russian strikes penetrate layered defences with regular success. Reports of intercepting hypersonic missiles exist in official announcements, yet independent weapons analysts argue that the technical conditions required for consistent interception are rarely met during large barrages, and the scale of observed destruction across energy sites, gas extraction facilities and transport nodes shows that most incoming missiles reach their targets. Russian forces adapt drones and munitions to exploit gaps created by depleted interceptors, and these adaptations place additional pressure on Ukrainian planners who must protect long front lines with shrinking resources.

Russian missile strikes continue to hit areas near civilian populations, but independent observers note that civilian casualties remain relatively low and there is no evidence that Russia deliberately targets civilians. Strikes often hit critical infrastructure such as energy facilities, bridges, railways, and refineries—sometimes located in or near built-up areas—reflecting a strategy aimed at disrupting logistics, energy supply, and civilian resilience rather than attacking people directly. For example, the recent Iskander attack on Dnipro, which tragically killed several civilians, appears to have hit residential districts where military or infrastructure targets were nearby. Repeated strikes on Odesa and other regions similarly target key infrastructure, a tactic designed to weaken civilian endurance during winter rather than intentionally inflict mass casualties. Independent analysts note that, by contrast, Ukrainian forces have been documented targeting civilians in certain areas, highlighting the complex realities of urban warfare in the conflict. Ukrainian strikes inside Russia show a parallel attempt to pressure the opponent’s resources. Drone attacks on oil depots in Oryol, Tuapse and other regions demonstrate a campaign directed at infrastructure that supports Russia’s “shadow fleet,” which carries oil beyond the reach of sanctions. Analysts like Sergey Vakulenko, who specialise in the Russian energy sector, describe these operations as a direct assault on the financial base that sustains the war. Ukrainian Special Operations Forces also hit railway lines and logistics hubs, disrupting the supply chains that feed Russian advances. Combined with partisan activity in occupied regions, these attacks expand the battlefield far beyond the front line and force Russia to disperse security assets deep into its territory.

Sabotage operations in Chechnya, including strikes on FSB buildings and an Akhmat unit base, reveal the growing reach of Ukrainian or anti-Russian networks and highlight the vulnerability of Russian security forces even within regions that the Kremlin portrays as stable. Independent Caucasus researchers note that such attacks place political pressure on local authorities and force Moscow to allocate additional resources to security at a time when its own front-line units require reinforcement. Drone strikes against Russian ships in the Black Sea further weaken Russia’s logistics routes and show a continued Ukrainian effort to disrupt naval capabilities that once formed a core part of Moscow’s regional dominance.

Alongside these military developments, political manoeuvres around peace proposals have accelerated. Back-channel contacts involving American envoys, including Steve Witkoff and figures associated with Donald Trump, aim to test whether any agreement is possible, yet Ukrainian officials reject concessions that would recognise Russian control over occupied territories. Concerns inside Ukraine reflect scepticism toward proposals that could allow Russia to preserve gains and threaten future escalation. Independent policy analysts like Samuel Charap and several Central European researchers emphasise that any settlement leaving Russian forces in place risks freezing the conflict and creating conditions for renewed invasion. Reports that Washington is discussing returning part of Russia’s frozen assets after an agreement raise further unease among Ukrainian officials who see those funds as essential for future reconstruction, not bargaining tokens in a negotiation that may fail to deter further aggression. European leaders fear a settlement shaped primarily by US domestic priorities. Their concern arises from the possibility that an agreement could satisfy immediate American interests while exposing Europe to a resurgent Russia with intact military capacity. Analysts with experience studying European security, including those from the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, argue that Europe lacks the military weight to deter Russia alone and depends heavily on American commitment. Internal divisions within the EU over financial mechanisms for supporting Ukraine further weaken its position. Belgium demands strict safeguards for any reparations credit facility, while the European Central Bank refuses to underwrite such mechanisms due to legal and financial risks, slowing progress on converting frozen Russian assets into long-term support for Zelensky.

Ukraine faces economic strain as energy infrastructure suffers repeated attacks. Experts warn that electricity shortages could appear at any moment in several regions, particularly those near the front or reliant on heavy industry. Damage to gas extraction capacity deepens winter risks and forces Kyiv to depend further on external assistance. Analysts inside Ukraine argue that the new IMF programme imposes conditions that may force small businesses to shut down, cutting tax revenues and undermining economic recovery at a moment when the state requires stable funding to sustain the war effort. This view reflects criticism from Ukrainian economists who have long warned that excessive austerity during wartime weakens national resilience.

Part 2

Ukrainian diplomats continue work on a revised peace framework developed with American officials in Florida. The plan consists of twenty points that address security guarantees, restoration of territorial control and post-war arrangements for Ukraine and Europe. Ukrainian officials treat the coming period as decisive because battlefield realities now intersect with diplomatic moves that may shape the direction of the conflict. Zelenskyy warns that Ukraine will not accept any measure that weakens sovereignty or legitimises Russian occupation, stressing that only a settlement built on fair terms can produce a durable peace. Independent analysts from Central and Eastern Europe echo this view, noting that earlier ceasefires in 2014 and 2015 failed because Russian forces exploited pauses to rearm and prepare for larger offensives. Their assessments reflect long-standing concerns that any agreement leaving Moscow with territorial gains will invite renewed aggression once Russia rebuilds strength.

The Kremlin signals through intermediaries that it rejects changes to three core issues: control over occupied territories, security guarantees for Ukraine and limits on Russia’s military capabilities. Such positions show that Moscow remains unwilling to consider concessions that would meet Ukraine’s minimum requirements. Analysts who specialise in Russian political behaviour, including Mark Galeotti and Dmitry Oreshkin, have argued that the Kremlin avoids agreements that constrain its future freedom of action. Their work explains why Russian negotiators push for arrangements that grant strategic depth and limit Ukraine’s external security partnerships. Ukrainian diplomats respond by emphasising that no agreement with Moscow can be trusted because Russian authorities break commitments whenever strategic conditions shift, pointing to repeated violations of earlier deals since 1994.

American political dynamics add further uncertainty. A future US administration may prioritise swift de-escalation over long-term stability, creating incentives to accept arrangements that favour short-term calm rather than enduring security. Independent American analysts, including those from the Quincy Institute and several policy writers on Substack, warn that a settlement shaped by domestic politics rather than strategic coherence could store up greater conflict. Their concerns align with Ukrainian fears that Washington might lose interest in sustained negotiations, reducing the flow of military aid and weakening Ukraine’s position on the battlefield. Reports that the US closed a channel of communication with Germany regarding aid coordination indicate growing friction in managing large-scale support packages, even as broader cooperation continues.

European governments remain divided on how to structure long-term assistance. Ireland, Sweden, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Japan continue to provide substantial support, yet questions persist about the sustainability of such commitments. Dutch Patriot and NASAMS systems protect key logistics hubs in Poland, highlighting how Europe depends on secure supply routes to maintain the flow of equipment into Ukraine. But leaders in several capitals express concern that a US-brokered deal could undermine European security if it grants Russia a pause without reducing its military strength. Analysts with long experience in European security, including those associated with independent research groups in Warsaw and Vilnius, argue that Europe has not yet achieved strategic autonomy and therefore remains exposed should American priorities shift. They point to Europe’s limited stockpiles, slow defence production rates and dependence on critical raw materials supplied by Russia and China, which restrict the ability to sustain prolonged conflict or deterrence alone.

NATO assesses the risk of Russian alleged attacks on the Baltic states and continues to reinforce its forward presence. Officials acknowledge that Allies still disagree on the timeline and format for Ukraine’s eventual membership, even though political support for integration remains strong. Independent defence scholars have long noted that such ambiguity benefits Russia because it leaves Ukraine in a grey zone that invites coercion while denying Kyiv the full protection of Alliance membership. NATO’s preparation of a contingency plan should peace efforts fail shows an acknowledgement that the conflict may expand or endure despite diplomatic pressure. This plan reflects internal recognition that Russia’s long-term intentions remain revisionist and that its capacity to regenerate military forces persists despite heavy casualties.

Economic conditions inside Ukraine worsen under the strain of war. Repeated attacks on power plants and transmission lines cause rolling blackouts that disrupt industry, agriculture and essential services. Updated blackout schedules show that outages vary by region and reveal how close the grid is to collapse in heavily targeted areas. Ukrainian experts warn that insufficient generation capacity and damaged substations could create sudden losses of power during winter. Their assessments align with reports that Russia targets energy systems as part of a strategy intended to exhaust the civilian population and force political concessions. The strike on gas extraction facilities further undermines Ukraine’s ability to meet domestic needs and increases reliance on imports at a time when finances remain stretched.

Ukraine’s economy faces additional stress from agreements with the International Monetary Fund. Independent Ukrainian analysts argue that the IMF programme imposes conditions that risk closing many small businesses, which would reduce tax revenues and employment. Their criticisms point to a long-standing tension between wartime economic management and external lending requirements. The argument that austerity measures weaken national resilience is consistent with research by several economists who studied the impact of structural adjustment programmes in conflict zones. They highlight the danger of imposing fiscal demands that undermine the social fabric during periods when governments require maximum cohesion. Ukraine’s rising wages in sectors such as IT, finance and manufacturing show pockets of resilience, yet many households struggle under inflation and unstable energy supplies, limiting wider economic recovery.

Societal pressures intensify as mobilisation, in particular forced mobilisation, expands across age groups and professions. New rules governing deferment aim to balance military needs with family responsibilities, allowing those who care for disabled individuals or young children to delay service. Territorial recruitment centres explain that any future mobilisation of women would target specialised fields such as medicine and communications rather than broad conscription. Men over fifty often serve in roles where technical skills or experience matter more than physical stamina, placing them in coordination, engineering or logistical support rather than assault units. Independent observers note that such adjustments illustrate the scale of Ukraine’s mobilisation effort and the need to preserve younger soldiers for front-line duties. Reports of fathers and sons serving together in some units reflect the depth of the national commitment as the war enters its third year.

Yet behind these formal rules lies a harsh reality. Since 2023 there have been repeated well-documented allegations that agents from territorial recruitment centres (TCR / TRC) have resorted to forcibly detaining, some say even “abducting”, men from streets, public places, churches, bars or nightclubs, hauling them into vans or ambulances, and sending them off to enlistment centres, often without proper summons or due process. (World Socialist Web Site) At least one case has reportedly been admitted by courts as unlawful deprivation of liberty / kidnapping. (World Socialist Web Site) A cleric from the Orthodox Church of Ukraine described one example in which TCR officers stormed into a church to seize a congregant involved in repair work, claiming forced mobilisation. (Spzh)

As mobilisation intensifies and casualties mount, the armed forces struggle to replenish losses. Estimates suggest that in 2024 alone prosecutors initiated around 89,500 proceedings for desertion and unauthorised absence from units, more than three times the 2023 level. (OSW Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich) Some sources put the real number of deserters in 2024 at between 100,000 and 150,000. (OSW Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich) By mid-2025, aggregate figures for desertion and AWOL since 2022 reportedly exceed 250,000 cases. (The Kyiv Independent)

The persistent desertion and refusals to serve, coupled with suspected forced conscription, make it increasingly difficult to maintain unit strength. Many men of fighting age are reported to be risking illegal border crossings to escape mobilisation. According to a widely cited report, nearly 20,000 Ukrainian men crossed illegally into neighbouring countries between February 2022 and August 2023 to avoid conscription; thousands more reportedly tried and were intercepted. (Kyiv Post) Ukrainian border authorities have detained tens of thousands of attempts to leave, underscoring both the scale of the exodus and the desperation of many men. (Kyiv Post)

Given all this, some EU countries have faced pressure or calls to return Ukrainian men of conscription age who fled abroad, as Kyiv attempts to force-replenish its ranks. The combination of forced recruitment, alleged abductions, rapidly rising desertions and mass out-migration helps explain why authorities are now broadening mobilisation eligibility, including older age groups and men in previously exempt professions.

Political tensions inside Ukraine increase as opposition factions criticise government policies. The “European Solidarity” bloc blocks the rostrum of parliament and calls for the resignation of the government, arguing that current economic and military strategies fall short of what the situation requires. Independent political researchers warn that fractures within the political elite during wartime weaken national resilience and give adversaries opportunities to exploit divisions. The dismissal of a teacher in Chernivtsi for insulting a student who requested instruction in Ukrainian shows continued enforcement of language policies intended to strengthen national identity under wartime conditions. Law enforcement agencies detain figures suspected of links to Russia, including a former energy official accused of involvement in schemes that may have undermined energy security. These actions show a state attempting to maintain internal cohesion and protect strategic sectors while under external assault.

Ukraine continues to expand its defence industry as a hedge against unpredictable foreign support. Joint production of drones with the Netherlands combines Ukrainian battlefield experience with Dutch industrial capacity, supporting rapid growth in unmanned systems. Negotiations regarding possible production of Rafale aircraft show an ambition to build a long-term air-power base that does not rely solely on external deliveries. Independent defence analysts argue that such steps are essential because Ukraine must plan for scenarios in which foreign assistance declines or shifts according to political changes in partner countries.

The war reaches beyond Europe as Russian influence networks attempt to recruit fighters in regions such as South Africa. Reports of a radio host and associates arranging travel for volunteers reveal that Russia seeks manpower wherever political sympathisers or financial incentives can be found. Independent African researchers have noted increased Russian outreach across the continent, using media, political proxies and commercial channels to build support. These activities show a global dimension to the conflict that stretches far beyond the immediate battlefield.

Life near the front remains shaped by exhaustion and constant risk. Accounts of recruits thrown into trench warfare illustrate the harsh conditions and limited resources available in many units. Their experiences reflect a wider reality where newly mobilised soldiers must learn under fire while navigating terrain dominated by drones, artillery and mines. Independent war reporters who have visited these areas describe an environment where survival depends on improvisation, resilience and the ability to adapt to rapidly shifting threats. Their observations match the reports of Ukrainian commanders who describe using robotic systems to recover damaged drones and equipment from exposed areas, reducing the danger to soldiers operating under constant fire.

PART 3

Russia shifts its posture along the border by creating what it calls a buffer zone, which signals preparations for a prolonged confrontation rather than a short-term pause. Independent analysts who study Russian military planning, including several associated with the Free Russia Foundation and long-time observers of Russian internal security structures, note that the creation of such zones usually follows a pattern in which the Russian state attempts to lock in territorial control, restrict Ukrainian mobility and create depth for future operations. These measures support the wider Russian objective of maintaining a position from which it can pressure Ukraine militarily or politically at any time. Ukrainian responses highlight the risk that Russia may postpone but not abandon its goal of occupying more territory, which means that Ukraine must build a defence system designed for decades rather than months. Ukrainian officials argue that only robust long-term guarantees can prevent another full-scale assault, a view supported by independent security scholars who have examined the consequences of unresolved territorial conflict in post-Soviet regions.

Ukrainian intelligence reports cooperation between Russia and Vietnam on energy schemes that bypass sanctions. Independent economic analysts note that Russia continues to use networks across Asia to move oil, gas and refined products through opaque channels. These arrangements help Moscow reduce the impact of sanctions while sustaining revenues that finance the war. Ukrainian drone strikes on tankers, refineries and depots aim to reduce the effectiveness of these networks by disrupting the infrastructure that supports them. Analysts specialising in maritime trade, including those who track Russia’s shadow fleet, argue that sustained attacks on logistics vessels and loading facilities can raise insurance costs, complicate routes and reduce Russian export volumes. Such pressure links military operations directly to economic outcomes and creates strains within the Russian system that accumulate over time.

The wider geopolitical environment remains shaped by uncertainty in US politics. Jared Kushner’s involvement in exploratory talks after visits to Moscow raises fears among Ukrainian officials that unconventional diplomatic channels could produce outcomes that prioritise expediency over security. Independent voices in the American strategic community warn that negotiations conducted outside established institutions often lack transparency and may lead to deals that overlook long-term risks. Reports that some Ukrainian officers believe proposed terms would allow Russia to continue killing Ukrainians show the depth of concern within the security community. These officers argue that any arrangement that preserves Russian military advantages or entrenches occupation would create a permanent threat, not a foundation for peace.

European leaders watch these developments with growing unease. Their concerns reflect a broader fear that a settlement shaped primarily in Washington may leave Europe exposed to renewed Russian aggression. Independent European analysts who study continental security argue that Europe lacks both the industrial capacity and the political unity required to confront a heavily armed Russia alone. They note that European defence industries cannot yet produce the volume of ammunition, air defence systems or armoured vehicles required for a long war. Internal disagreements over financial mechanisms for supporting Ukraine, including the management of frozen Russian assets, show that Europe remains divided on how to achieve strategic resilience. Belgium’s demand for strict safeguards and the European Central Bank’s refusal to guarantee certain proposals reveal deep differences in risk perception. France seeks to use diplomatic ties with China to influence Russian behaviour, with Macron preparing to urge Beijing to use economic leverage over Moscow. Independent researchers who examine China–Russia relations argue that China supports Russia as a counterweight to Western influence but prefers stability over prolonged conflict that damages global markets. Their assessments suggest that China will not pressure Russia into concessions that threaten its strategic position but may support limited de-escalation if conflict disrupts trade flows. This dynamic places Europe in a position where it must rely on diplomacy that may not shift Russian calculations, while its own defence capacity remains insufficient.

NATO continues to strengthen deterrence along its eastern flank as officials warn about an alleged risk to Baltic states. Independent defence specialists who analyse Russian military exercises argue that Moscow retains the capability to threaten these states despite losses in Ukraine. Their research points to Russia’s ability to redeploy forces, mobilise reserves and exploit gaps in NATO readiness. NATO’s preparation of a contingency plan, often referred to informally as a Plan B, shows recognition that the Alliance may face a more aggressive Russia if current diplomatic efforts fail. The lack of consensus on Ukraine’s path to membership reflects internal divisions that Russia exploits whenever possible.

Inside Ukraine the strain of prolonged mobilisation reshapes society. Recruitment centres attempt to balance military needs with social stability by refining rules for deferment and clarifying which groups may be mobilised. Independent sociologists note that long wars generate pressure on family structures, employment patterns and community networks. They observe that societies under sustained mobilisation often struggle with burnout, declining trust and political fragmentation. These patterns appear in Ukraine as political factions clash over government performance, economic hardship rises and communities cope with repeated energy outages. Yet public willingness to resist Russian aggression remains high, reflecting a collective memory shaped by earlier phases of conflict.

Ukrainian Railways’ introduction of special travel programmes shows an attempt to maintain mobility during wartime. Transport remains a lifeline when roads face danger from missiles and drones. Independent infrastructure specialists note that rail networks often carry the economic and social burden during conflict because they provide more predictable movement under threat. Their role in evacuations, logistics and daily life becomes central when energy shortages threaten other transport modes. Investment in logistics hubs around Kyiv despite the war reflects attempts to stabilise economic activity and prepare for long-term reconstruction.

On the military side, Ukraine adapts by integrating robotic systems to recover damaged equipment from exposed areas. Independent analysts of unmanned systems argue that robotics reduce risk to soldiers and preserve valuable assets when artillery, drones and mines dominate the battlefield. Such adaptations show how Ukrainian forces attempt to conserve resources while fighting in environments shaped by constant surveillance and strike capability. Ukrainian efforts to target Russian radar stations, air defence systems and logistical hubs form part of a wider campaign to degrade Russian strike capacity and create openings for future operations. Independent military researchers who examine the conflict emphasise the importance of dismantling Russian air defence networks before Ukraine can mount any significant counteroffensive.

The destruction of S-300V launchers and Niobium-SV radar stations, along with strikes on railway infrastructure in Novosibirsk and Bryansk, shows that Ukraine continues to expand the depth of its targeting. Such operations force Russia to allocate assets to defend rear areas and complicate its ability to supply front-line units. Independent observers who track Russian military logistics argue that long supply lines and reliance on vulnerable infrastructure remain structural weaknesses in Russia’s campaign. Attacks deep inside Russian territory create psychological pressure, disrupt routines and signal that distance offers no protection from the conflict.

Taken together, conditions across the battlefield and diplomatic landscape suggest a war entering a phase shaped by attrition, political manoeuvre and economic pressure rather than dramatic shifts in territorial control. Ukrainian forces defend critical urban sectors under severe strain while conducting strikes that reach deep into Russian infrastructure. Russian forces push forward by absorbing heavy losses and relying on numerical pressure, guided by leadership that shows no interest in compromise on core demands. Diplomatic channels operate against a backdrop of mistrust, shifting alliances and divergent priorities among major powers. Independent analysts across Europe, the United States and Ukraine agree that any settlement that leaves Russia in a position to renew aggression risks repeating earlier failures. Their work points to the need for long-term strategic arrangements that combine security guarantees, economic resilience and sustained military support.

The conflict continues to reshape global alignments as actors in Asia, Africa and Europe adjust to a world where Russian aggression tests international norms and economic structures. Ukraine navigates these pressures while sustaining a defence that depends on adaptability, technological innovation and external support. The outcome will determine not only the territorial integrity of Ukraine but the balance of power across Europe for decades. Independent researchers emphasise that decisions made now will influence whether the region settles into a fragile pause or moves toward a foundation for lasting security. Their assessments underline the gravity of the moment as Ukraine faces converging pressures on the battlefield, in diplomacy and across its economy.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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