Al‑Sharaa’s Moscow Visit Shows Russia Adapting to Assad’s Fall
On 15th of October 2025 President Vladimir Putin met President Ahmed al‑Sharaa of Syria in Moscow. On the face of it, the move looks paradoxical: al‑Sharaa’s forces overthrew Bashar al‑Assad in December 2024, a regime Russia heavily backed. Yet Moscow’s invitation reflects a complicated recalibration of its Syria policy, driven less by ideology than by strategic survival. The trip signals Russia’s effort to preserve influence in a rapidly changing Middle East while adapting to its own constraints.
When al‑Sharaa arrived in Moscow he asserted that Damascus would “restore and redefine” ties with Russia and respect all prior agreements. (Al Jazeera) Putin quickly responded with vocabulary of longstanding “friendly relations,” praising recent Syrian elections as a means to strengthen cooperation. (The Moscow Times) The public framing is intended to smooth over the rupture in loyalty that Assad’s ouster implied. Behind that façade lie tense negotiations over military basing, reconstruction rights, influence over security forces, and Syria’s external alignments.
From Russia’s perspective, the invitation is defensive as much as proactive. Its military intervention in Syria since 2015 served to prop up Assad, project power in the eastern Mediterranean, and assert Russia as a global player. (csis.org) Now that the Assad regime has collapsed, Russia has lost prestige as a “guarantor” of regime survival. Chatham House analysts described the fall as damaging Russia’s reputation as a reliable ally. (chathamhouse.org) Yet total loss of Syria would represent a strategic defeat Russia cannot afford. Moscow retains military access at its bases in Hmeimim (air) and Tartus (naval), but the terms of those leases are now uncertain. (Reuters) Russia must persuade a new Syrian government to accept its continued role on more favourable or at least acceptable terms.
The invitation also signals that Moscow recognises it cannot cling to the old Assad‑centric order unaltered. Independent analysts of Russia’s strategic posture argue Moscow may have tacitly allowed the regime change, or at least anticipated it, as part of a broader realignment to focus on Ukraine and reduce its burdens in Syria. A think tank analysis by Strategiecs argues that Moscow’s choice to preserve bases rather than cling to Assad suggests a preference for strategic flexibility. (Stratigics) The invitation to al‑Sharaa reflects that shift: Russia is repositioning itself not as master of Syria but as indispensable partner to whoever rules there.
From Syria’s side, al‑Sharaa comes to Moscow from a point of weakness and opportunity. His forces owe much of their military materiel to Russian equipment, and Syria’s reconstruction requires outside technical and financial resources. (Türkiye Today) He must balance multiple pressures: Arab states expect him to distance from Iran and Russia; Turkey seeks influence in northern Syria; and Israel exerts military pressure from the south. Reaffirming Russia’s role protects Syria’s reconstruction and defence options. Al‑Sharaa’s requests in Moscow reportedly include Russian help rebuilding Syria’s army, ensuring Russia does not rearm remnants of Assad’s loyalists, and enforcing limits on Israeli strikes. (fdd.org) He is also expected to press Moscow to hand over Assad for trial. (Reuters) That latter demand, however, is largely symbolic. Russia earned Assad’s trust over decades, and extraditing him would sever the trust on which many of Russia’s patronage relationships depend.
In the short term, Moscow must extract concrete guarantees that the bases at Hmeimim and Tartus remain under its control under new legal status. Press reports indicate that discussions explicitly included preserving these strategic footholds. (Reuters) But Syrian sovereignty sentiment is strong under the new regime; al‑Sharaa emphasised the need to “redefine” relations to reflect a sovereign and unified Syria. (Al Jazeera) That formula allows for Russian bases, but under rules more concessive to Damascus.
Russia also faces legacies of popular resentment. Many Syrians blame Moscow for war crimes when it indiscriminately bombed areas held by opposition and rebel groups including HTS (Hayat Tahrir al‑Sham), which is al‑Sharaa’s origin formation. (fdd.org) Public memory of civilian suffering under Russian bombing may limit how boldly Moscow asserts political control. For that reason, Russia likely prefers soft influence over heavy-handed rule.
The regional implications of the invitation are broad. For Arab states and Gulf powers, Moscow signals it remains a meaningful interlocutor. Russia postponed the Arab‑Russia summit to avoid undercutting diplomatic dynamics in Gaza, demonstrating willingness to defer to Arab priorities. (theguardian.com) Moscow needs to rebuild alliances in the Arab world after its relative absence from the Gaza diplomacy. The invitation to al‑Sharaa, a figure once denounced as a terrorist by the U.S., shows Moscow’s capacity to engage even in messy transitions. That contrasts with Washington’s hesitance to deal openly with figures branded extremist.
For Turkey and Iran, both of which had heavy influence in Syria through militias, this shift matters. Iran loses some leverage if Russia strengthens ties with Damascus under new leadership that pivots away from Tehran. Turkey, which occupies northern Syria, may view Moscow’s affirmations with caution: Russia could become a guarantor of Syrian unity and resist Turkish fragmentation efforts. Al‑Sharaa’s request that Russia help curtail Turkish influence over Kurdish and border zones may become a negotiation theatre.
Western powers observe this move warily. Analysts and commentators in Western media cast al‑Sharaa’s visit as evidence of Russia’s weakened grip, forced to embrace a former enemy. But that is a superficial reading. Russia’s sustained presence after Assad’s fall is not failure but adaptation. Its invitation to al‑Sharaa is a turn in its Syrian strategy away from regime support toward power brokerage. Still, Russia’s position is weaker than in 2015. It cannot afford large-scale deployment and must operate within Syrian constraints.
Longer term, the success of the partnership depends on a delicate balance. If Russia extracts too many privileges, it will provoke backlash in Damascus and from Arab states. If it concedes too much, it risks losing strategic basing and credibility. For al‑Sharaa, continued reliance on foreign powers weakens his claim to sovereignty. He must ensure that public sentiment does not view him as Moscow’s client. Meanwhile, Syria’s strategic weight has declined; its relevance as a theatre for great power competition is lower than in the Syrian war’s peak. Moscow’s resources are stretched by Ukraine, limiting how much it can commit to Syria.
The invitation is a calculated gamble. It expresses Moscow’s intention to remain in Syria as a core power broker, not as guarantor of a collapsed regime. It gives al‑Sharaa space to legitimise his new government and secure critical support. But it also binds him to Russian interests to a degree. Russia cannot walk away without surrendering its hard-won gains; al‑Sharaa cannot afford to alienate potential Arab, Western or regional backers.
In sum, Russia’s invitation to al‑Sharaa signals that Moscow has accepted the end of the Assad era, but refuses to cede Syria entirely. It aims to preserve leverage through bases, security influence and reconstruction ties. Al‑Sharaa’s acceptance of the invitation confirms he recognises Russia as a necessary partner in Syria’s weakened condition. The diplomacy ahead will reveal whether Russia can maintain influence in a post‑Assad Syria, or whether new regional alignments will override the legacy of Moscow’s Syrian venture.
Authored By: Global Geopolitics
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