Global geopolitics

Public pressure in France and Poland rises amid war fatigue, economic strain and growing distrust of EU authority.

(Featured Image Translation: “20 years of betrayal… of our Constitution. The EU is killing us! Let us free ourselves! FREXIT.” Credit: Pascal Laurent )

Public support for EU withdrawal in France and Poland now reaches levels that challenge assumptions of permanent membership in the bloc. A December 2025 survey by Cluster17 for the platform Le Grand Continent shows 27 per cent of French respondents favour leaving the European Union and 12 per cent undecided. The same poll records 25 per cent support for a Polish exit and 6 per cent undecided. These numbers mark a clear shift, especially in Poland where just a few years earlier support for EU membership regularly exceeded 90 per cent.

In France discontent among voters often aligns with arguments advanced by Rassemblement National under its leader Marine Le Pen, which has long argued that decisions in Brussels erode national control over immigration, economy and social policy. Many voters express concern that EU regulation undermines the authority of the French state and limits its ability to protect national labour, agriculture and industry. Critics argue that rules crafted for a wide union fail to account for local conditions in rural and economically fragile regions. Economic stagnation and the cost of living crisis feed perceptions that membership brings more burdens than benefits.

In Poland the erosion of support for the EU reflects a mixture of cultural, economic and political factors. Polls by the Polish centre-left outlet CBOS published in 2024 show that favourable views of membership dropped to their lowest in over a decade. The share of voters believing that EU membership advantages outweigh disadvantages slipped, while opposition rose to 17 per cent. A separate 2024 poll reported that nearly 70 per cent of Poles prefer to retain the national currency, the złoty, rather than adopt the euro. The resistance to the euro underlines a broader reluctance to cede monetary or fiscal sovereignty to Brussels.

Voters also register growing disquiet about migration and border control. A 2025 survey for the newspaper Rzeczpospolita found that nearly two-thirds of Poles favour reintroducing border controls within the Schengen Area to curb migration. This demand reflects concerns that immigrant inflows and EU relocation quotas overload public services and dilute national cohesion.

The political class in Warsaw reflects these sentiments. Figures from the ultraconservative party Confederation call openly for preparing a legal pathway out of the EU. A senior MP, Michał Wawer, told a national broadcaster in April 2025 that Poland should be ready to exit if the EU continues what he described as overbearing policy in trade, regulation and migration. Such discourse remains fringe in government, but it gains traction amid rising dissatisfaction with economic and cultural pressures.

Polish politics in 2025 further complicates the picture. The government led by Donald Tusk remains formally committed to EU membership and to EU-level cooperation on energy prices, migration and economic challenges. Tusk emphasised the need for collective action at EU level to curb energy costs and manage migration during Poland’s presidency of the Council of the EU. Yet nearly half of Poles reportedly support his resignation, reflecting deep domestic polarisation. This contradiction exposes a growing divide between political elites trying to uphold EU commitments and segments of the electorate leaning toward national retrenchment.

The war in Ukraine created further pressure within electorates that already felt stretched by economic strain and political uncertainty. Many voters across France and Poland now connect the billions committed to Ukraine with domestic hardship, because public services show visible decay while taxes rise and living costs increase. Governments in Paris and Warsaw backed major financial and military aid packages, yet growing numbers of citizens question whether open-ended commitments serve their national interests during a period of inflation, wage stagnation and repeated budget shortfalls. War fatigue grows steadily because voters observe little progress on the battlefield and little clarity on long-term objectives, and this fatigue strengthens political actors who argue that Brussels pursues strategic goals without regard for national priorities.

Perceptions of authoritarian behaviour by unelected EU institutions intensified these pressures, because voters increasingly view decisions on sanctions, energy rules, defence commitments and fiscal measures as imposed rather than negotiated. The cumulative effect of prolonged conflict, heavy spending, rising taxes, and weakened public services produced an environment in which claims of democratic deficit gain credibility. French and Polish voters now speak more openly about a loss of control over national policy, because decisions tied to the Ukraine war flow through European structures that few citizens feel able to influence. This sentiment reinforces support for exit movements and feeds the belief that EU institutions operate beyond the reach of electoral accountability.

Observers of European politics highlight a broader trend that extends beyond France and Poland. Across the EU public faith in supranational institutions appears more fragile than often assumed. A 2025 survey by the Pew Research Center found that while median favourable opinion of the EU across 25 countries remained 62 per cent, support in many older member states weakened. In Poland the decline in favourable views was one of the steepest among large member states.

The example of the UK’s 2016 referendum and the subsequent exit of the United Kingdom remains salient and instructive. Leading voices of the exit campaign such as Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage framed their argument in terms of regaining national sovereignty, controlling immigration and restoring legal autonomy. They appealed to voters’ dissatisfaction with what many saw as unchecked bureaucratic power in Brussels. That campaign succeeded despite forecasts of economic disruption and warnings from businesses. The United Kingdom still copes with the consequences of trade friction, regulatory divergence and internal divisions.

Frexit and Polexit sentiment today draw on many of the same grievances. Voters in France echo demands for national control on borders, approval of laws, and economic leeway. In Poland cultural resistance to EU social policy, distrust of climate regulations, insistence on national currency and scepticism about further regulatory alignment raise the same questions that drove Leave in Britain.

Yet important differences remain. Poland depends heavily on EU structural funds, foreign investment tied to EU membership, and trade relationships facilitated by membership. Withdrawal would risk economic contraction, fiscal shortfalls, and investor uncertainty. France occupies a central role within the eurozone and in EU budgetary allocations. Its withdrawal or major renegotiation would unsettle financial markets across Europe.

The current political and security environment makes exit more complicated than in 2016 Britain. Poland lies at the eastern border of the Union and faces persistent security threats. Cooperation through EU defence and economic instruments offers some buffer against instability. France plays a central role in European security and foreign policy; opting out now would raise questions for continental defence cooperation and global standing.

A realignment instead of a full exit may emerge. Several analysts describe a shift toward “differentiated disintegration,” where states retain trade and economic cooperation with the EU while opting out of deeper political integration. Under such a model Poland or France or both could abandon full alignment on currency, migration policy or social regulation while preserving cooperation on trade, defence or infrastructure.

Such a transformation would stress current institutions, requiring renegotiations of treaties, voting procedures and budget contributions. Social cohesion in multi-state frameworks would face strain if citizens begin to view the Union as optional rather than foundational. Strategic coherence on external threats would weaken when member states diverge in policy aims or leave entirely.

Political actors who now push for looser ties or outright exit may seek to capitalise on public frustration with energy costs, inflation and immigration pressure. If mainstream parties fail to offer credible reforms addressing those issues, eurosceptic voices may gain ground in elections across several member states.

If the European Union fails to adapt its governance model in response to growing disaffection among core members, then its future may resemble not a sudden collapse but a gradual loosening of ties. The trust that once underpinned integration may erode steadily as public sentiment, political demands and national interest pull members toward autonomy. The coming decade may decide whether the Union transforms into a looser association of states rather than a tightly integrated bloc.

Authored By: Global Geopolitics

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