Zimbabwe mines the limestone and grows the phosphate, yet Zimbabweans pay double what their neighbours pay for the same bag
A political-economy investigation into why local raw materials do not produce local prices, and who captures the difference between the mine and the shelf
Opinion Analysis | November 2026
The question posed on the floor of the National Assembly on 11 November 2026 was sharper than most parliamentary questions because it began from a material fact that admitted no evasion. Government Chief Whip Pupurai Togarepi told the House that cement averaged about seven dollars a bag across the Southern African region while Zimbabweans paid fifteen dollars and up to seventeen dollars in outlying areas (New Ziana, 2026). He added that ammonium nitrate sold for about fifty-three dollars locally against thirty-two dollars in neighbouring countries, and that some farmers had begun crossing into Zambia to buy fertiliser because even after transport costs the imported product worked out cheaper (Herald, 2026). The question he asked was why a product mined and manufactured inside the country should cost more than the same product brought across a border, and he suggested that profiteering might be the answer (New Ziana, 2026). The Speaker directed the Minister of Industry and Commerce to present a ministerial statement on the matter, which is the procedural response that a serious Parliament is supposed to make (Herald, 2026).
Following the method Brian Berletic and Alex Krainer have each set out, which treats the political and economic circus as the instrument through which principals escape scrutiny, this article asks why Zimbabwe’s local raw materials do not produce local prices and who captures the difference between the mine and the shelf. Brian Berletic’s analytical method begins with the instruction to ignore the political circus and go to the policy papers, because the documents that define a policy usually state its purpose more clearly than any speech about it. The relevant documents in this case are not hidden, and they include the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Industry and Commerce report on the fertiliser value chain, the National Competitiveness Commission’s fertiliser cost build-up, the statutory instrument that restricted cement imports, and the published tariff schedules of the Zimbabwe Electricity Supply Authority and the National Railways of Zimbabwe. Those documents already identify the cost drivers, the ownership structures and the points at which value is captured, and the ministerial statement will add little unless it opens the same ledgers to public view. Berletic’s second instruction is to trace who benefits from the arrangement rather than who is blamed for it, because blame is the instrument through which principals protect themselves from scrutiny (Berletic, 2026).
The cement case repays the Berletic treatment because the industry’s own conduct supplies the controlled experiment that settles the question of whether high prices reflect cost or rent. In 2023 the price of a bag climbed from between eight and eleven dollars to between eighteen and twenty dollars within two months, and producers attributed the increase to production costs and shortages (The Standard, 2023). The government responded by liberalising imports, issuing more than six hundred licences and allowing individuals to bring in up to five tonnes each, and the price fell from twenty dollars to about eleven dollars within weeks while PPC advertised an official price of ten dollars fifty (Herald, 2023; CemNet, 2023). A price that halves when a border opens cannot be explained by limestone, coal or labour, because none of those inputs changed when the licences were issued. The difference between the protected price and the liberalised price is a rent, and the rent accrued to the producers and their shareholders for as long as the protection lasted.
The market structure that made the rent possible is a documented oligopoly rather than a speculative one. Three producers, namely PPC Zimbabwe, Khaya Cement and Sino Zimbabwe Cement, accounted for more than seventy-five per cent of the market in 2023, and the three had competed for close to fifty years under a regime in which imports required government permits (The Standard, 2023). Installed milling capacity reached slightly over three million tonnes a year against national demand just below two million tonnes, which means the country had a surplus of capacity and still experienced scarcity pricing (The Standard, 2023). PPC and Khaya both lobbied publicly for restrictions on imports, and Khaya’s own financial statements described cheap imported cement as a serious threat to the domestic industry (Insider, 2023). The producers were not concealing their preference for protection, and the government supplied it through Statutory Instrument 89 of 2021, which removed cement from the open general import licence and placed it under a permit regime (CemNet, 2021).
The ownership of the cement producers complicates the claim that this is a Zimbabwean industry charging Zimbabwean prices for Zimbabwean raw materials. PPC Zimbabwe is eighty-eight per cent owned by PPC Limited, a company listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, with the remaining twelve per cent held by the National Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Fund (PPC, 2026). Khaya Cement, formerly LafargeHolcim, passed into corporate rescue and new ownership after Holcim sold the business in 2021, and six of the country’s eight cement producers are Chinese-owned according to testimony given at a PPC capital markets day (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2026). The limestone is Zimbabwean and the labour is Zimbabwean, while the capital that captures the rent is substantially foreign and the dividend flows outward. The nationalist framing of the question therefore obscures the direction in which the surplus actually travels.
Alex Krainer’s contribution to this analysis is the insistence that the cost of financing is frequently larger than the cost of production, and that the financier captures a share of the surplus before the producer or the consumer sees any of it. PPC invested eighty-two million dollars in a third Harare plant and Khaya invested five point two million dollars in a vertical plant, and those investments require a return that must be recovered through the price of the product (The Standard, 2023). The return on capital is a legitimate cost in a market economy, and its magnitude depends on the price that the market will bear, which in a protected oligopoly is the price that the producers choose to set. The homebuilder who pays fifteen dollars for a bag is therefore paying for the plant, the shareholder dividend, the maintenance backlog and the cost of the debt that financed the expansion, and the largest single component of that payment is the return on capital rather than the limestone.
The fertiliser case differs from the cement case in its technical details and resembles it in its political economy, because the claim that the raw materials are Zimbabwean is accurate for phosphate rock and false for nitrogen. Sable Chemicals produces ammonium nitrate at Kwekwe from imported ammonia gas, and the National Competitiveness Commission’s value chain report records that imported ammonia constitutes eighty-two per cent of the total cost of production (NCC, 2022, p. 24). Sable decommissioned its electrolysis plant and now imports ammonia from South Africa, which means the principal input into the principal nitrogen fertiliser is foreign and priced in foreign currency (Herald, 2022). Zimbabwe does not produce ammonia at commercial scale, and the Muzarabani gas discovery remains prospective rather than operational (NCC, 2022, p. 25). The phosphate rock at Dorowa is genuinely local, and the plant suspended operations in April 2025 and was operating at twenty per cent capacity, while ZimPhos ran its conversion hub at five per cent capacity and left a 1.7 million dollar granulator idle for want of 1.3 million dollars in installation funding (Zimbabwe Situation, 2026).
The cost build-up that the Parliamentary Committee extracted from the manufacturers is the closest thing to a policy paper that the fertiliser debate has produced, and it deserves to be read in full rather than summarised. Zimbabwe Fertiliser Company management told the committee that top dressing could sell for fifteen to twenty dollars a fifty-kilogram bag if the domestic value chain operated efficiently, and that reaching that price depended on continuous production at Dorowa, ZimPhos and Sable, supported by rail infrastructure and adequate working capital (Herald, 2026). ETG Fertiliser told the same committee that basal fertiliser could be supplied at twenty-five to twenty-seven dollars under stable conditions and increased local sourcing (Herald, 2026). The current price of top dressing sits between forty-eight and fifty-five dollars, which means the gap between the actual price and the achievable price is roughly thirty dollars a bag, and that gap is the measure of the value chain’s collapse (Herald, 2026).
The collapse of the upstream state-owned entities is the central fact of the fertiliser story, and it is a fact about public investment rather than private greed. Sable Chemicals is approximately thirty-six to thirty-seven per cent government-owned through Chemplex, and the Mutapa Investment Fund is raising that stake to sixty-nine per cent while disbursing one hundred and fifty-three million dollars across Dorowa, ZFC, ZimPhos and Sable (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2026; AllAfrica, 2026). ZFC and ZimPhos sit under Chemplex, and the state therefore owns the failing primary producers whose underperformance is the largest single cause of the high price (Parliament of Zimbabwe, 2026). The private blenders, including ZFC, Windmill, Omnia and ETG, earn a margin on granulation and blending, and their margins are modest relative to the cost of the imported ammonia and the cost of the working capital that finances the inventory (Zimbabwe Situation, 2026). The farmer pays for the state’s failure to maintain its own assets, and the state then blames the private sector for the resulting price.
Krainer’s lens illuminates the fertiliser case more sharply than any other, because the cost of working capital is embedded in every bag and the rate at which it is priced is punitive. The Reserve Bank’s policy rate stood at 27.5 per cent in September 2026 after reductions from 35 per cent at the start of the year, and commercial lending rates in local currency ranged between forty and forty-seven per cent (The Zimbabwe Mail, 2026; Bulls n Bears, 2026). The committee chairperson reported that all fertiliser companies faced capital challenges, and that the government itself owed manufacturers outstanding payments that had strained their working capital (Bulls n Bears, 2026). A blender that borrows at forty per cent to finance a six-month inventory cycle must recover roughly twenty per cent of the inventory value in interest alone, which on a fifty-dollar bag is ten dollars before any raw material is purchased. The interest is not a visible line on the receipt, and it is the largest single reason why the same ammonia landed in Harare costs more than it does in Lusaka.
The Berletic question about principal and proxy applies with full force to the political response that followed Togarepi’s intervention. The minister will present a statement, the committee will table a report, and the language of profiteering will circulate, while the documents already identify the causes as import dependence, collapsed upstream capacity, rail failure, electricity tariffs and the cost of working capital. The proxy in this narrative is the “profiteer” who charges fifteen dollars for a bag of cement, and the principal is the policy regime that restricted imports, undercapitalised the parastatals, set electricity at sixteen cents a kilowatt-hour against six cents in the region, and allowed the railways to charge seven cents a tonne-kilometre against 1.79 cents in South Africa (Insider, 2023; Business Daily, 2026). Blaming the proxy allows the principal to escape scrutiny, and the principal in this case is the state itself in its capacity as protector of the cement oligopoly and owner of the fertiliser value chain.
The electricity tariff is a policy variable rather than a natural disadvantage, and the Parliamentary Committee was explicit that energy costs are the sector’s biggest cost driver. Industrial power in Zimbabwe costs 16.07 US cents a kilowatt-hour, while the committee chairperson noted that regional competitors pay around six cents, and the World Bank’s cost-of-service study projected 22.33 cents for 2026, which means the current tariff is below the projected cost of service but still far above the regional average (Business Daily, 2026; Business Daily, 2026). Cement production consumes four to five gigajoules per tonne and power accounts for twenty to thirty per cent of total production costs, so the tariff difference alone accounts for a substantial share of the price gap (Herald, 2021). The same logic applies to fertiliser granulation, which is energy-intensive, and to the rail freight that moves ammonia and phosphate across the country. The high price is therefore partly a subsidy to ZESA’s revenue requirement and partly a subsidy to the road haulage industry that has replaced the railways.
The rail comparison completes the cost picture and reveals the same pattern of policy-created disadvantage. The cement producers told President Mnangagwa in 2021 that rail cost seven cents a tonne-kilometre in Zimbabwe against 1.79 cents in South Africa and 3.92 cents in Zambia, and that road transport was almost double the South African cost (Insider, 2023). The National Railways of Zimbabwe now levies close to ten cents a tonne-kilometre, and the Hwange to Harare haul works out at almost seventy cents a kilometre per tonne (Business Daily, 2026). A cement plant in Colleen Bawn that ships to Harare, or a fertiliser blender in Harare that receives ammonia from South Africa, pays a logistics premium that its Zambian competitor does not, and that premium is the product of underinvestment in rolling stock, signalling and track rather than of geography. The geography is fixed and the logistics are chosen.
The question of who benefits from the arrangement has a clear answer once the ownership and pricing structures are laid out. The cement producers benefit from protection, the blenders benefit from the spread between imported input costs and the administered price, the banks benefit from lending at forty per cent to finance inventory, and the political class benefits from the licensing power that determines who may import and on what terms. The farmers and homebuilders bear the cost, and the state-owned upstream entities bear the reputational cost of their own decay. The beneficiaries are not a conspiracy in the sense of a secret meeting, and the coordination happens through the ordinary operation of protected markets, administered prices and publicly owned assets that have been allowed to fail. The principal is a coalition of protected capital and a state that has chosen protection over competition and asset maintenance over asset revival.
A genuine investigation would publish the cost build-up line by line and compare each line with Zambia and South Africa, and it would name the beneficiaries of every licence, tariff and contract along the chain. It would open the cement producers’ transfer pricing, the fertiliser blenders’ import invoices, the banks’ effective lending rates and the parastatals’ procurement records, and it would set a timetable for the removal of the protection that allows the rent to persist. The committee has already done part of this work, and its report on the fertiliser value chain contains the cost estimates that the minister will be asked to explain (Herald, 2026). The test of the ministerial statement is whether it adds numbers to the record or merely adds adjectives, and the public can judge that test within a single parliamentary session.
The trajectory most consistent with the evidence is continued volatility punctuated by liberalisation episodes that temporarily collapse the price and are then reversed under producer pressure. The 2023 cement liberalisation showed that the price can fall by half within weeks, and the subsequent re-imposition of licensing showed that the political system prefers protection to cheap construction materials. The fertiliser value chain will improve only if Sable, ZimPhos and Dorowa are capitalised and operated at scale, and the Mutapa disbursements of one hundred and fifty-three million dollars are a test of whether the state can maintain its own assets rather than a solution in themselves. If the upstream plants return to capacity and the railways recover, the achievable price of fifteen to twenty dollars a bag becomes realistic, and if they do not, the farmer will continue to cross into Zambia with a empty truck and return with a loaded one.
The price of a bag is a distributional statement before it is an economic one, and it tells the reader who has the power to charge, who has the power to protect and who is left to pay. The cement oligopoly charges a rent that the border protects, and the fertiliser value chain passes on the cost of imported ammonia and the cost of capital that the state has failed to provide cheaply. The answer to Togarepi’s question is not a single villain but a structure that can be described in a paragraph and dismantled only through a sustained political programme. The first step in that programme is to insist that the ministerial statement contain numbers, because a debate conducted without numbers is the political circus that Berletic warns against and the rentier arrangement that Krainer describes will continue to set the price.
Authored By: Global GeoPolitics
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References
AllAfrica (2026) ‘Zimbabwe: Mutapa Investment Fund commits U.S.$153 million to revive fertiliser production’, AllAfrica, 9 April.
Berletic, B. (2026) ‘US policy papers: crystal balls seeing into the future’, Sovereignista, 8 November.
Bulls n Bears (2026) ‘Working capital constraints choke fertiliser firms’, Bulls n Bears, 19 March.
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National Competitiveness Commission (2022) Fertilizer Value Chain Report. Harare: NCC.
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