Global geopolitics

The United States has neither the plans nor the partners to make a confrontation work.

The recent RAND Corporation report on U.S.-China relations presents a marked departure from confident narratives of American strategic dominance. Rather than outlining how Washington can impose systemic change on Beijing, the document focuses on stabilising the rivalry. In doing so it implicitly concedes that the United States currently does not possess a fully effective set of mechanisms to destabilise the People’s Republic of China. The evidence in the report, corroborated by independent analysts, suggests that structural, strategic and economic constraints curtail U.S. capacity to force meaningful strategic change in China.

The first major limitation lies in the United States’ admitted capability gap in economic state-craft. The report states that “The United States needs to expand its expertise in economic analysis… develop and implement more-sophisticated modelling and simulation… better learn from the experience of trade policy measures, sanctions, and export controls instituted since 2017.” That sentence reflects an institutional acknowledgement of insufficiency: Washington lacks the modelling, the data, the simulation infrastructure and perhaps the internal coherence to predict how sanctions or export controls will affect China or the U.S. itself. In effect, one of the primary tools of destabilisation, economic coercion, is undermined by uncertain outcome.

Independent scholarship supports that assertion. For instance, a recent study of global value-chains finds that China has become more deeply embedded upstream in supply-chains, incorporating intermediate goods and inputs from around the world, such that relocation away from China by U.S. firms produces only limited reduction of China-linked value-chain exposure. (“Global Supply Chain Reallocation and Shift under Triple Crises” finds that “China’s exports remained robust … expanded across global markets … and sustained a rise in GVC participation … while U.S. imports increasingly shifted toward ‘China+1’ partners whose trade structures remain closely tied to Chinese upstream supply-chains.”) That pattern demonstrates how Chinese resilience complicates the design of coercive economic strategy, and how U.S. modelling would face high levels of uncertainty.

Second, the report emphasises the allied weakness in any coordinated strategy against China. It points out that Australia will only act if faced with an “existential” threat plus “significant and irreversible” damage under heavy U.S. pressure; Japan is technically capable but politically paralysed absent U.S. arm-twisting; the United Kingdom is ambiguous and concerned about self-inflicted costs of confrontation. The implication is stark: in a real crisis, the United States would likely have to act almost alone, especially on the economic front. If bilateral U.S. action lacks broad allied support or sustainment, then any destabilisation effort is inherently limited.

Moreover, independent commentary suggests that the private sector poses a wildcard in the efficacy of U.S. coercion. The RAND report underscores that “Coordination and planning need to involve the private sector because businesses do not always act as governments would want, and markets adjust…” In other words, even if Washington decides to flick the switch on sanctions or export controls, corporate actors may reroute supply chains via Dubai, Ho Chi Minh City or Singapore faster than regulation can keep up. Global trade reporting confirms this: one article comments that “[w]hile much attention has been given to U.S tariffs, … businesses are diversifying sourcing strategies … tapping emerging markets… networks rapidly supporting the shift.” That agility reduces the immediacy and potency of U.S. state-tools.

Third, the report observes that China today is a very different entity from the China of 2018. The authors note that “China has been building an economy less susceptible to outside pressures… but employment remain highly dependent on exports.” That admission is sobering: Beijing has had years to adapt, restructure, build domestic substitution, shift internal demand, and harden its economy against external shock. Independent sources corroborate that trend. An analysis of China and global supply-chains finds that “China remains a major supplier of textile inputs … still making gains in higher value segments of apparel sectors … no country can replicate China’s highly-optimised production ecosystem at scale.” That means the old U.S. playbook, threaten exclusion, restrict supply-chains, impose tariffs, has reduced impact when applied to a harder, more integrated China.

The fourth limitation is explicit in the report’s suggestion that sanctions alone are unlikely to deter China. It states: “Sanctions alone are unlikely to deter… they can serve as an important element in a combination of tools.” That means coercion must be embedded within a larger strategy of diplomatic isolation, forward-deployed forces and credible threat of military involvement if one seeks to destabilise China. Because Washington lacks, or cannot credibly demonstrate, the forward-force posture Beijing believes will fight, the economic measures lack the strategic backing to shift Chinese behaviour. Hence the destabilisation toolbox is incomplete.

The RAND report thus paints a picture of Washington constrained, not absent will, but lacking means. This is aligned with independent commentary. Researchers at the German think-tank MERICS write that China is moving toward industrial autonomy, quoting that “China’s institutional strengths, its vast domestic market, its complete industrial system and its abundant human resources” give it structural resilience even if the U.S. attempts supply-chain decoupling. Elsewhere scholars note that hardware-centric export controls, such as those on semiconductors, face practical limits and evasion and thus cannot be relied upon alone as destabilising weapons. The combined weight of modelling gaps, alliance fragility, private-sector agility, and Chinese resilience supports the view that the U.S. regime of tools is ineffective for forcing systemic change in China.

It is important, however, to clarify what “no credible toolkit to destabilise China” means. It does not mean “zero tools exist.” The United States retains significant advantages: dominance of key technologies, a large reserve-currency platform, alliance frameworks, global presence in financial systems and leadership of some regulatory frameworks. But the crux lies in converting those advantages into destabilising thrust, that is, forcing Beijing to alter its strategic posture, internal governance or global ambitions in response to American coercion. On that front, the RAND document and the independent literature suggest the conversion path is blocked, slow or unpredictable.

If one evaluates the concept of destabilisation, meaning provoke meaningful internal stress in China, prompt regime change, or force a radical shift in Chinese foreign policy, then the limitations appear acute. If the target is more modest, slow China’s ascendancy, increase its costs, deter aggressive behaviour, then the U.S. may have partial capacity. But the RAND document emphasises stabilisation of the rivalry, not transformational change. Thus it implicitly concedes that the tools available are insufficient for destabilisation as operationalised.

This matters for U.S. policy. Firstly, the U.S. has to stop assuming that it can unilaterally impose systemic change in China through economic coercion or supply-chain manoeuvres. The RAND report frames the objective as avoiding war, maintaining competition, and managing risk. The shift from expecting destabilisation to planning for long-term competition is evident. Secondly, the U.S. must invest in its modelling, simulation and economic-analysis capabilities, as that remains a structural weakness. The ability to anticipate ripple-effects in supply-chains, corporate behaviour, allied reactions and Chinese counter-moves remains limited. Without that foundation, tools remain blunt. Thirdly, the U.S. must recognise that China’s resilience means any coercive strike will likely yield limited impact and potentially unintended consequences, such as supply-chain bifurcation, alliance strain or economic feedback into the U.S. itself.

From a geopolitical vantage point, the consequences are significant. The United States may need to accept that a stable competition with China, rather than destabilisation, is the more feasible path. China’s industrial base and value-chain embedment are deepening rather than receding. For instance, the global value-chain study demonstrates that Chinese exports remained robust and participation grew even during shocks. That indicates that the U.S. cannot simply “turn off” China’s manufacturing engine or force large-scale decoupling without self-harm. Furthermore, attempts at unilateral or hurried decoupling risk global output losses of significant magnitude, as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) warns those actions could reduce GDP by up to 12 per cent in some economies through disruption to trade flows. Even if that data stems from mainstream institutions, it underscores how tenuous aggressive decoupling strategies are.

Another dimension is that China is actively building structural defences. As one article notes, Beijing’s current Five-Year Plan emphasises building a modernised industrial system, strengthening real economy manufacturing, advancing indigenous innovation and “independent control” over industrial and supply-chain systems. That means China does not plan merely to resist U.S. coercion; it plans to institutionalise autonomy and resilience. In such an environment, U.S. coercion will face not only reactive resilience but proactive structural hardening. Thus the destabilisation window is narrowing, not expanding.

The private-sector factor deserves emphasis: corporations have mobility, flexibility, and profit incentives that diverge from government-coercion plans. The RAND report’s recognition of this is important. For example, businesses may shift operations to third-party hubs, adjust logistics faster than state action, and exploit regulatory gaps. In such a world, sanctions or export controls become less effective unless governments coordinate globally and address corporate behaviour comprehensively. But allied coordination is weak and national regulatory regimes diverge. That means U.S. coercion will likely be met by corporate workaround rather than systemic disruption of China.

A further nuance is that destabilisation through economic levers may not lead to desired strategic outcomes. China might suffer economic stress but still maintain or even strengthen internal cohesion or adopt more authoritarian governance. The U.S. aim of altering behaviour might thus fail even if economic pressure is applied. The RAND report implicitly recognises that risk by centring its strategy on stabilisation rather than forcing change. Independent analysts emphasise that the assumption “economic pain leads to strategic change” may no longer hold in China’s context. China’s diversified economy, large domestic market, robust public control and long-term planning suggests that Beijing may absorb pressure rather than capitulate. Hence a destabilisation strategy may misread Chinese strategic logic.

In sum, the evidence points strongly to the conclusion that the United States currently lacks the integrated, credible toolkit to destabilise China meaningfully. The structural constraints are real: modelling weakness in economic state-craft, fragile allied coordination, private-sector independence, Chinese resilience and institutionalised autonomy. The RAND report articulates this bluntly through its focus on stabilisation, not intervention. Independent scholarship reinforces that view by documenting China’s value-chain embedment, resilience to export controls, and ability to pivot to internal demand. Therefore if the U.S. hopes to destabilise China, defined as forcing systemic strategic change, it faces a much steeper challenge than is commonly acknowledged.

Policy makers should respond to this reality not by doubling down on coercion illusions but by calibrating for long-term competition, strengthening internal capacities (data, modelling, simulation, economic-policy analysis), improving allied coordination, addressing private-sector dynamics and acknowledging that China is more resistant than past assumptions allowed. The U.S. must also rethink the objective from destabilisation to deterrence and competition. The strategic logic of the twenty-first century China–U.S. rivalry may not be one of short-shock victory but prolonged contest under constraint.

Post-script: one caution is warranted. While the report and independent commentary show U.S. limitations, they do not show absolute impotence. The United States still wields significant tools, technology leadership, financial systems, global alliances and could use them incrementally. The key message is that destabilisation, understood as large-scale, rapid strategic change in China, is not credible under current conditions. Recognising that limits, rather than over-reaching, offers a clear path toward realistic strategy for Washington.

Authored By: Global Geopolitics

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