The Chay Bowes case reveals a legal technology in which punishment precedes proof, evidence is withheld, and the category of disinformation licenses what the criminal law cannot
Opinion Analysis | November 2026
The designation of Chay Bowes by the Council of the European Union on 10 November 2026 belongs to a category of legal act whose defining feature is that it punishes without a trial. The Council’s sanctions ledger accuses him of “implementing, supporting and facilitating actions … which undermine or threaten democracy, the rule of law, stability or security in the Union, in an international organisation and in third countries” and of being “involved in the regular amplification” of “anti-Western and anti-Ukraine disinformation” produced by Russian troll farms (European Council, 2026). The consequences are concrete and immediate: his assets are frozen, his bank accounts are locked except for essential purchases, he is banned from travelling to other member states, and no Irish individual or business may transfer money to him without a waiver from the Council itself. The evidence supporting these conclusions is contained in classified packs, and the accused has not seen it, cannot see it, and has no forum in which to contest it.
The sanctioning of a journalist by designation rather than by prosecution is the central institutional fact of this case, and it is a fact about the architecture of European governance rather than about any particular official’s intentions. Criminal law proceeds by charge, disclosure, defence, hearing and verdict, and each stage exists because the accumulated experience of centuries established that authority which punishes without these safeguards will punish the innocent alongside the guilty. The sanctions regime dispenses with every stage, and it does so legitimately, by being classified as administrative rather than criminal. The Court of Justice of the European Union has upheld the regime’s compatibility with fundamental rights on condition that the Council discloses the essence of the reasons and gives the affected person an opportunity to respond, and the practice of classified evidence packs has repeatedly tested whether those conditions are met in substance rather than form (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2019).
The evidence packs themselves have a documented history of unreliability that the Council has not adequately addressed. Politico’s investigation in 2023 found that the packs used to justify sanctions against Russian business, media and political figures were often hastily compiled and based on shaky evidence, and it recorded specific instances in which the evidence against Russian businessman Grigory Berezkin was drawn from articles written by an AI chatbot and from a website called Russian Crimes written by journalists who did not exist (Politico, 2023). The finding is significant not because it establishes that every pack is unreliable but because it establishes that the verification process does not reliably distinguish between reliable and unreliable material. A procedure that produces designations on the basis of fabricated sources is a procedure whose output cannot be trusted, and the inability of the designated person to examine the material ensures that the fabrication will not be discovered by the person with the greatest interest in discovering it.
The Irish dimension of the case demonstrates how a foreign institution can supply an instrument that domestic authority would find difficult to use directly, and the demonstration is worth tracing in detail. Bowes co-founded The Ditch, an investigative outlet that in 2020 published evidence that the then Taoiseach Leo Varadkar had passed confidential documents to a personal friend, which resulted in a criminal investigation against Varadkar (RT, 2026). The outlet subsequently published investigations into undeclared assets that led to the resignation of two government ministers from Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael, and a further investigation into the chairman of Ireland’s planning authority, Paul Hyde, who was sentenced to two months in prison for making false declarations of his property interests (RT, 2026). The Taoiseach Micheál Martin accused Bowes and The Ditch in parliament in 2023 of working with Russia to undermine his government, and the sanction followed three years later. The sequence does not establish that the sanction is retaliation, and the coincidence of the institutional interests involved is sufficient to require that the evidence be public before the punishment is imposed.
The philosophical tradition that illuminates this case begins with the recognition that the defining feature of a witch-hunt is not the falsity of the accusation but the impossibility of disproving it. The historian Hugh Trevor-Roper observed that the witch-finders of early modern Europe constructed a crime whose very denial was treated as further evidence of guilt, and that the procedure was designed to produce a confession rather than to establish a fact (Trevor-Roper, 1969). Norman Cohn’s study of the European witch trials documented the mechanism by which the accused was required to prove a negative against evidence that was never disclosed and testimony that could not be tested (Cohn, 1975). The structural parallel with the sanctions regime is exact: the designated person is required to demonstrate that he did not facilitate disinformation, against evidence he has not seen, in a proceeding whose outcome is determined by the body that compiled the evidence.
Hannah Arendt’s analysis of the “objective enemy” in totalitarian systems provides the category that the current practice approximates without fully reaching. Arendt argued that the totalitarian state did not need to establish that a person had committed an offence, because the category of the objective enemy was defined by the regime’s assessment of the person’s position rather than by his conduct (Arendt, 1951). The sanctions regime does not go that far, and it has moved toward a related position in which the designation rests on an administrative assessment of a person’s role in a network rather than on a finding of unlawful conduct. The distinction between the enemy who is judged by what he has done and the enemy who is judged by what he is has been the central concern of the liberal legal tradition since the French Revolution, and the tradition’s foundational texts were written precisely to establish that no person should be punished for his associations or his opinions.
Carl Schmitt’s critique of the liberal state’s attempt to proceduralise political conflict is relevant here in a paradoxical way, because the sanctions regime has adopted the position that Schmitt attributed to the sovereign and that the liberal tradition rejected. Schmitt argued that the sovereign is the authority who decides on the exception, and that the liberal attempt to subject political conflict to legal procedure is incoherent because the friend-enemy distinction cannot be juridified (Schmitt, 1922). The sanctions regime is an instance of the sovereign decision in Schmitt’s sense, because it identifies the enemy by administrative act and imposes consequences without the mediation of a court. The liberal tradition’s objection to this procedure is not that Schmitt was wrong about how sovereignty operates but that his account describes a condition the law exists to prevent, and the European Union’s adoption of the procedure is a descent from legality toward the administrative coercion that the tradition was designed to constrain.
The ideological dimension of the case concerns the category of disinformation and the work that the category performs in licensing what the criminal law could not. Criminal prohibitions on speech must be defined with sufficient precision to permit a person to know in advance what is prohibited, and they must be interpreted by courts whose reasoning is public and reviewable. The category of disinformation has none of these features, because it is expansive enough to capture any statement that an official body regards as misleading and because its application is determined by the same body that defines it. The European External Action Service has itself documented the difficulty of defining disinformation with precision in its own reports, and the difficulty is not a technical problem to be solved but a feature of a category whose function is to license the exercise of discretionary power (European External Action Service, 2023). A government that wishes to suppress a journalist does not need to prove that he lied, and it needs only to establish that his output falls within a category whose boundaries it controls.
The descent from liberal legality to administrative coercion is not a sudden event but a sequence of institutional decisions each of which appears defensible in isolation. The sequence in the European Union began with targeted sanctions against individuals associated with the Russian state, expanded to include the prohibition of designated broadcasters, extended to the criminalisation of sanctions evasion, and now includes the designation of a citizen of a member state for amplifying designated content (Council of the European Union, 2022; Council of the European Union, 2026). Each step was justified by the previous step and by the exigency of the conflict, and the cumulative effect is a regime in which a European citizen can be deprived of access to the financial system of his own country on the basis of evidence he cannot see. The pattern is recognisable from the historical record of emergency legislation, in which measures that were introduced as temporary and exceptional become permanent and routine, and in which the exceptions accumulate until the exception has become the rule.
Rosa Luxemburg’s critique of the erosion of legality under conditions of emergency is instructive because it was formulated in a context far removed from the current one and because its logic does not depend on that context. Luxemburg argued that a ruling class that cannot secure consent for its programme will resort to the suspension of legal guarantees, and that the suspension is presented as a temporary necessity while its effect is to establish a permanent condition in which opposition is criminalised (Luxemburg, 1906). E. P. Thompson’s later formulation is more precise and more relevant, because Thompson argued that the rule of law is a “peculiar institution” that imposes real constraints on power even when it is administered by a ruling class (Thompson, 1975). The sanctions regime is an instance of the opposite: an institution that dispenses with the constraints while presenting itself as an instrument of justice, and the liberal tradition’s achievement in establishing those constraints is being dismantled by a body that invokes liberal values in the act of dismantling them.
The victim-centred framework requires beginning with the person who is acted upon, and the person in this case is a journalist whose access to the financial system of his own country has been revoked on the basis of evidence he has not seen. The framework’s question, what options for self-determination were removed, has a precise answer: Bowes cannot travel to other member states, cannot receive payment from Irish individuals or businesses without a waiver, cannot conduct the ordinary transactions through which a life is sustained, and cannot contest the decision in a forum where the evidence is disclosed. The restriction is not a prison sentence and it is not a fine, and it is a deprivation of the material conditions of participation in the society of which he is a citizen. A legal order that can impose such a deprivation without disclosure has established a power whose limits are set by the discretion of the authority that exercises it.
The institutional incentives that produce this outcome are bureaucratic rather than conspiratorial, and the framework requires that they be described as such. The officials who compile the evidence packs are not obliged to test their material in an adversarial forum, and they are rewarded for producing designations rather than for withstanding challenge. The Council acts by unanimity, which means that no single member state can be held responsible for the designation, and the diffusion of responsibility is a feature of the procedure rather than an accident. The European Parliament’s role is limited to receiving information rather than to approving designations, and the Court of Justice reviews the formal adequacy of the reasons rather than the substance of the evidence. Each institution performs its function according to its own incentives, and the cumulative outcome is a procedure whose design ensures that no institution is accountable for the result.
The historical comparison that illuminates this case is not the Inquisition or the Stalinist show trial, because the European Union is not those things and the comparison would be inaccurate. The illuminating comparison is the administrative state that developed in the twentieth century to manage populations without the delays and uncertainties of criminal procedure, and whose distinguishing feature was the fusion of investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions in a single body. Franz Neumann’s analysis of the legal structure of the Nazi state identified this fusion as the mechanism through which legality was replaced by administrative discretion, and he argued that the result was a state in which the administration decided what was lawful rather than a state in which the law decided what the administration could do (Neumann, 1942). The European sanctions regime approximates this structure in the specific domain of political speech, and the approximation is partial while its direction is clear.
The ideologies that sustain the regime are liberal in form and illiberal in operation, and the contradiction between form and operation is the source of the regime’s legitimacy. The Council presents the designations as measures in defence of democracy, the rule of law and European values, and the presentation is sincere in the sense that the officials believe it. The measures themselves are administrative acts without judicial authorisation, and their defence of the rule of law consists in the suspension of the rule of law. The mechanism is familiar from the history of emergency government, in which the suspension is justified by the threat that it is said to address and the threat is then cited as evidence that the suspension must continue. The ideology performs the function that Gramsci attributed to hegemony, because it secures consent for measures that would otherwise be resisted, and the consent is secured among the audiences whose support the regime requires rather than among the populations that are subjected to it.
The counter-argument that the measures are proportionate to the threat deserves serious engagement rather than dismissal, because a liberal order does face genuine challenges from foreign information operations and because a state that cannot respond to them is not obviously more just than one that can. The difficulty with the counter-argument is that the proportionality cannot be assessed without examining the evidence, and the evidence is classified precisely to prevent its examination. A measure whose justification is secret and whose application is discretionary cannot be assessed for proportionality, and the claim that it is proportionate becomes an article of faith rather than a conclusion of reason. The appropriate liberal response to this difficulty is not to abandon the measures but to subject them to the procedural safeguards that the criminal law evolved, and the absence of those safeguards is the deficiency that the case exposes.
The trajectory that the evidence supports involves the continued expansion of the designation regime as the conflict with Russia continues and as the category of disinformation extends to additional domains. The European Union has established a framework for designating individuals across the whole of its foreign policy, and the framework is capable of application to any person whose activities are judged to undermine its objectives. The precedent set by the Bowes designation is that a citizen of a member state can be sanctioned for amplifying designated content, and the precedent will be available for use in other contexts where the content is judged harmful to other objectives. The direction of travel is toward a regime in which the boundaries of permissible speech are determined by administrative act rather than by legislation and judicial decision, and the direction is clear even where the pace is uncertain.
The resistance that the case has provoked is itself a data point, because the responses available to the affected person indicate the state of the legal order. Bowes has announced that he will challenge the sanctions legally, and the challenge will test whether the Court of Justice is willing to require disclosure of evidence that the Council wishes to keep secret (RT, 2026). The court has previously annulled designations where the evidence was insufficient and where the reasons were inadequate, and the precedent supports the possibility of relief while it does not guarantee it (Court of Justice of the European Union, 2019). The case will be a test of whether the liberal legal order retains the capacity to constrain the administration that has grown within it, and the outcome will depend on whether the court treats the disclosure requirement as a substantive safeguard or as a formal procedure.
The broader question that the case raises concerns the conditions under which a society that describes itself as free can maintain its description when the mechanisms of coercion have migrated from the criminal law into administrative practice. The migration is not a conspiracy and it is not a sudden break, and it is the cumulative effect of many decisions each of which was defended as necessary and proportionate. The defence of freedom in such a condition requires not a single dramatic resistance but the patient reconstruction of the procedural safeguards that the migration has eroded, and the reconstruction begins with the recognition that a punishment imposed without disclosure is a punishment whose legitimacy cannot be established. The case of Chay Bowes is a small instance of a large development, and the development is the descent of a liberal order into the administrative coercion that its own legal tradition was designed to prevent.
Authored By: Global GeoPolitics
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References
Arendt, H. (1951) The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Harcourt, Brace.
Cohn, N. (1975) Europe’s Inner Demons: An Enquiry Inspired by the Great Witch-Hunt. London: Sussex University Press.
Council of the European Union (2022) Council Regulation (EU) 2022/1904 amending Regulation (EU) No 833/2014 concerning restrictive measures in view of Russia’s actions destabilising the situation in Ukraine. Official Journal of the European Union, L 259.
Council of the European Union (2026) Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/2841 concerning restrictive measures in respect of actions undermining or threatening the territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence of Ukraine. Official Journal of the European Union, L.
Court of Justice of the European Union (2019) Case C-530/17 P, Azarov v Council, judgment of 19 December 2018. Luxembourg: CJEU.
European External Action Service (2023) Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Policy. Brussels: EEAS.
Luxemburg, R. (1906) The Mass Strike, the Political Party and the Trade Unions. Hamburg: Erdmann Dubber (English edition: London: Harper and Row, 1971).
Neumann, F. (1942) Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism. New York: Oxford University Press.
Politico (2023) ‘Revealed: The EU’s shoddy evidence for Russia sanctions’, Politico, 12 December.
RT (2026) ‘How the EU’s “authoritarian network” sanctioned Chay Bowes’, RT, 11 November. Available at: https://www.rt.com/ (Accessed: 17 November 2026).
Schmitt, C. (1922) Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot (English edition: Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
Thompson, E. P. (1975) Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act. London: Allen Lane.
Trevor-Roper, H. (1969) The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. London: Penguin.
Chay Bowes: How the European Union Sanctioned an Irish Journalist Without Showing Anyone the Evidence
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