Why every scare about hacked fridges, grounded planes and Iranian bombs ends with public money moving into private hands
Opinion Analysis | November 2026
The concept that organises the analysis is the one that Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky developed in 1988, and it remains the most precise account of how the corporate media system produces consent for state policy. The propaganda model identified five filters through which information passes before publication: the ownership and profit orientation of the media, the dependence on advertising revenue, the reliance on official sources, the disciplining effect of flake (criticism), and the unifying ideology of anti-communism that has since been reconfigured as the war on terror and then as the contest with China and Russia (Herman and Chomsky, 1988). The model’s contribution was to demonstrate that the filters operate structurally rather than through conscious instruction, which means that the journalists who pass material through them believe they are reporting facts and that the facts have been shaped before the reporting begins. The current media environment has added a further filter, which is the algorithmic distribution of attention that rewards threat content and penalises ambiguity (Wu, 2016).
The interpretive move that converts an infrastructure failure into evidence of a coordinated campaign is not self-validating, and the available evidence for such coordination comes from a body of investigative work that the article now draws upon. Whitney Webb’s research documents the institutional continuities between intelligence-adjacent investment firms and the policy agendas those firms promote, and her method is archival rather than speculative because it traces directorships, fund structures and contractual relationships across decades (Webb, 2023). Catherine Austin Fitts, a former Assistant Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, has documented the movement of public funds through unaudited federal accounting structures and into the private institutions that administer them, and her work on the “missing money” is grounded in the Treasury’s own statements of differences between reported and reconciled balances (Fitts and Skidmore, 2017). The DoD’s inspector general has reported that the department has failed its annual financial audit in every year since the requirement took effect, and that it cannot account for the majority of its assets (DoD Office of Inspector General, 2025). WikiLeaks published diplomatic and intelligence cables that established the gap between the public justification of policy and the private reasoning behind it, and the cables’ authenticity has been confirmed by the governments whose communications they contained (WikiLeaks, 2010). The interpretive problem that this body of work confronts is that prediction and planning produce identical public records, and the difference between them is established by evidence of coordination rather than by the coincidence of forecast and outcome.
The pattern of public figures forecasting crises that subsequently materialise has been treated by commentators as evidence of orchestration, and the treatment requires more evidentiary care than it usually receives. Klaus Schwab’s published forecasts about cyber attacks and pandemics, Bill Gates’s funding of pandemic preparedness and his subsequent advocacy of vaccine infrastructure, and Yuval Noah Harari’s discussions of data-driven governance all belong to a documented record of elite discourse about future contingencies (Schwab, 2016; Gates, 2015; Harari, 2016). The record establishes that the forecasts were made and that the institutions making them were positioned to benefit from the responses, and it does not by itself establish that the forecasts were plans. The distinction is the one the article has been arguing for throughout, and it applies to dissenting as well as to official claims: a standard that treats coincidence as proof will convict the innocent alongside the guilty, and a standard that requires documentary evidence of coordination will identify the coordination where it exists
The FAA case supplies a concrete instance in which the coincidence of a public failure and a funding request can be dated, priced and traced to named institutions. The November 2025 ground stop was attributed by the Transportation Secretary to aging equipment and overloaded routers, and the attribution was made on the same day that the administration requested additional appropriations for air traffic control modernisation and that the Secretary publicly raised the figure (A.J. Signal Not Noise, 2026). The contract for the replacement system had been awarded in December 2025 to Peraton, a company owned by the private equity firm Veritas Capital, and the programme is priced at approximately thirty-one billion dollars of which Congress has appropriated roughly twelve billion as a down payment (A.J. Signal Not Noise, 2026). Veritas Capital’s fund is reported to include commitments from Israeli institutional investors including Clal Insurance, Migdal Insurance and Menora Mivtachim, and Peraton’s registered lobbyist is reported to sit on the board of the nonprofit that funded the Transportation Secretary’s television programme (A.J. Signal Not Noise, 2026). The sequence does not establish that the outage was engineered, and it establishes something more durable: that the institutional arrangements convert public failure into private revenue regardless of whether the failure is accidental or arranged.
The radiological allegations against Iran are the element of the sequence that most directly invokes the historical precedent, and the precedent deserves to be reconstructed in detail because it establishes what the genre can produce. The Bush administration’s campaign for the invasion of Iraq relied on claims about mobile biological weapons laboratories, aluminium tubes intended for centrifuges, and an active nuclear programme, and each claim was sourced to defectors or to intelligence that had been assessed as unreliable before it was used (Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2004). The Senate committee’s report documented that the intelligence community had produced assessments that were unsupported by the underlying evidence and that the administration had presented those assessments to the public without the qualifications that the analysts had attached. The Iraq Survey Group’s final report confirmed after the invasion that no stockpiles existed and that the programme had been dormant since 1991 (Duelfer, 2004). The episode established that official claims of weapons proliferation can be false, that the falsity can be documented after the fact, and that the officials responsible are not held to account.
The Iranian case has followed a similar trajectory over a longer period, and the trajectory is documented in the public record. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 concluded with high confidence that Iran had halted its nuclear weapons design programme in 2003, and the estimate was published and then substantially ignored in subsequent policy discourse (National Intelligence Council, 2007). The Netanyahu presentation of 2018 displayed documents that were said to prove an active programme, and the documents were subsequently assessed by the International Atomic Energy Agency to relate to activities that had ended more than a decade earlier (IAEA, 2018). The 2025 strikes on Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan followed the collapse of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and were justified by allegations that the agency had not substantiated. The current allegations about a radiological dispersal device and an attack on the Hoover Dam belong to this lineage, and the lineage’s defining feature is that each allegation is treated as novel while the previous allegations are quietly withdrawn.
The discussion of attacks on dams is the element of the sequence that concerns the law of armed conflict, and the law on this question is unusually categorical. Article 56 of Additional Protocol I prohibits attacks on dams, dykes and nuclear generating stations where such attacks may cause severe losses among the civilian population, and the prohibition applies even where the installations are military objectives (ICRC, 1977). The prohibition reflects the experience of the Second World War, in which the Dambusters raid and the bombing of the Möhne and Eder dams killed approximately 1,600 civilians, and it has been reaffirmed in subsequent protocols and in the customary law of armed conflict. The destruction of the Nova Kakhovka dam in June 2023 demonstrated that the prohibition is violated in practice and that the consequences include flooding, displacement and the destruction of agricultural land on a scale that the term “military objective” cannot capture (Human Rights Watch, 2023). The media discussion of attacking Iranian dams is therefore a discussion of an act that international law prohibits, and the discussion’s normalisation is the mechanism through which the prohibition is eroded.
The third carrier deployment is the element of the sequence that belongs to the domain of verifiable material fact, and its significance requires an understanding of naval force posture. The United States Navy maintains carrier strike groups that are deployed to the Gulf region on a rotational basis, and the concentration of three carriers in a single theatre is a significant escalation that analysts of military posture would treat as a signal (NAVCENT, 2026). The carriers are accompanied by guided-missile cruisers, destroyers and submarines, and the strike groups carry aircraft capable of conducting sustained operations against land targets. The deployment is real and the capability is real, and the question of what the deployment is intended to signal requires an analysis of the political context in which it occurs. The context includes the collapse of the JCPOA, the strikes of 2025, the continuing conflict in Ukraine, and the political transition in Washington, and the combination of these factors suggests a preparation for action rather than a routine rotation.
The historical record of what the intelligence services call “false flag” operations is the element that the analysis requires and that official discourse refuses to acknowledge. The Gulf of Tonkin incident of August 1964, in which the Johnson administration claimed that North Vietnamese vessels had attacked American destroyers, was subsequently established by declassified documents to have been based on faulty signals intelligence and to have been misrepresented to Congress (NSA, 2005). The Nayirah testimony of October 1990, in which a fifteen-year-old girl told Congress that Iraqi soldiers had removed babies from incubators, was organised by the public relations firm Hill and Knowlton on behalf of the Kuwaiti government and was subsequently established to be fabricated (Rowse, 1991). Operation Gladio, the NATO stay-behind network that operated in Italy and elsewhere during the Cold War, was documented by a parliamentary inquiry that established its involvement in acts of terrorism that were attributed to the left (Italian Senate, 2000). The pattern is not a theory and it is a documented record of states organising violence and attributing it to adversaries.
The institutional layer that distinguishes the present period from earlier ones is the apparatus of disinformation governance that has been constructed since 2016, and its architecture is documented in public sources. The European Union’s Digital Services Act, which entered into force in 2024, imposes obligations on platforms to assess systemic risks and to mitigate them, and the assessment is conducted by the platforms under the supervision of the Commission (European Union, 2022). The European External Action Service maintains a rapid alert system that coordinates with member states and with platforms on disinformation, and the system’s reports have designated Russian and Chinese outlets as sources of disinformation (EEAS, 2023). The United States has developed a parallel architecture through the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, the State Department’s Global Engagement Center, and a network of non-governmental organisations that receive government and philanthropic funding to monitor and counter disinformation (Stanford Internet Observatory, 2023). The architecture is real, it is well funded, and its categories are defined by the institutions that operate it.
The critical function that the architecture performs is the designation of the categories through which dissent is expressed, and the mechanism operates by shifting the boundary between legitimate criticism and prohibited disinformation. The concept of disinformation is defined in the European Union’s framework as false or misleading information that is created, presented and disseminated for economic gain or to deceive the public, and the definition is expansive enough to capture a wide range of political speech (European Commission, 2018). The institutions that apply the definition are the same institutions whose policies the speech criticises, and the structural conflict of interest is inherent in the arrangement rather than a consequence of any individual’s bias. The effect is that the categories through which opposition to war is expressed can be designated as disinformation, and the designation licenses the measures that the earlier sections of this analysis have described.
The intellectual tradition that theorises the permanent state of exception supplies the framework for understanding how the present period relates to the earlier ones. Giorgio Agamben argued that the state of exception, which was originally a temporary suspension of law during emergencies, has become the normal paradigm of government in modern states (Agamben, 2005). The argument extends Carl Schmitt’s observation that the sovereign is the authority who decides on the exception, and it adds the empirical claim that the exception has become permanent (Schmitt, 1922). Naomi Klein’s analysis of disaster capitalism documented the mechanism through which crises are used to impose measures that would otherwise be resisted, and her account of the Iraq war’s reconstruction contracts and the Hurricane Katrina school reforms established the pattern (Klein, 2007). The current sequence of scares belongs to this lineage, and its function is to produce a crisis that would license the measures that the institutions have prepared.
The class analysis of the arrangement begins with the observation that the beneficiaries are identifiable through the budget and through the market. The defence contractors whose revenues rise with each deployment, the cybersecurity firms whose contracts expand with each scare, the media organisations whose audiences grow with each warning, and the technology platforms whose regulatory obligations are shaped by the institutions that designate disinformation all benefit from the arrangement. Lockheed Martin, RTX and Northrop Grumman have reported record backlogs across the period of the Ukraine and Middle East conflicts, and the cybersecurity firms that contract with CISA and with the European institutions have reported comparable growth (SIPRI, 2025). The beneficiaries are not a conspiracy in the sense of a secret meeting, because their coordination occurs through the ordinary operation of markets and institutions, and the arrangement is a class interest expressed through institutional structures.
The populations that bear the costs are the ones that the framework requires us to name. The Iranians who would be killed by any attack on their infrastructure, and whose water and electricity would be the targets that the media discussion has normalised, are the first. The Americans who are being told to fear an attack in their capital, and whose fear is being mobilised without their consent, are the second. The populations of the Gulf states whose territory hosts the carriers and whose cities would be within range of any retaliation are the third. The populations of the Global South whose energy and food prices would rise with any disruption to the Strait of Hormuz are the fourth. None of these populations has a voice in the decisions that determine their fate, and the sequence of scares serves to make their situation legible without making it contestable.
The political economy of attention explains why the sequence is intensifying rather than diminishing, and the explanation is material rather than psychological. The platform environment in which political communication now occurs rewards threat content, because threat generates engagement and engagement generates revenue (Wu, 2016). The incentive operates on official communicators and on their critics alike, and the result is a competitive escalation in which each side produces more alarming content in order to hold its audience. The document under examination is itself an instance of the dynamic, because its prediction of an event before January is a bid for attention that would not be made in an environment that rewarded accuracy over engagement. The dynamic is structural and it will not be corrected by appeals to individual restraint.
The alternative that the analysis points toward is not credulity about official claims, because the record of the past quarter century establishes that official claims are frequently false. The alternative is a standard of evidence applied consistently to all claims, in which a claim is assessed by the quality of its sources rather than by the identity of the actor who makes it. Such a standard would require officials to publish the evidence on which their warnings rest, and it would require critics to do the same. The standard is demanding and it is the only one that can distinguish a justified warning from a manipulation, because the distinction cannot be made by examining the warning’s content alone.
The most plausible trajectory for the coming months involves continued escalation of rhetoric and continued deployment of force, with the possibility of a significant incident that would be interpreted by each side as confirming its narrative. The populations that would bear the costs of an incident are the populations with the least influence over whether it occurs, and their situation is the strongest argument for the evidentiary standard that the genre of anticipation abandons. The task of analysis in such a conjuncture is to insist on the procedural conditions under which any claim could be assessed, and the insistence is the only contribution that analysis can make to a politics it does not control. The preparation phase is real, the material buildup is real, and the populations at risk are real, and the recognition of those realities is the precondition for any effective opposition to the sequence that the evidence describes.
Authored By: Global GeoPolitics
Thank you for visiting. This is a reader-supported publication. If you believe journalism should serve the public, not the powerful, and you’re in a position to help, becoming a PAID SUBSCRIBER truly makes a difference. Alternatively you can support by way of a cup of coffee:
Buy Global Geopolitics a coffee |
Buy Global Geopolitics a pizza
Bitcoin: 3NiK8BoRZnkwJSHZSekuXKFizGPopkE7
References
Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Antonakakis, M., April, T., Bailey, M., Bernhard, M., Bursztein, E., Cochran, J., Durumeric, Z., Halderman, J. A., Invernizzi, L., Kallitsis, M., Kumar, D., Lever, C., Li, Z., Nadji, Y., Paxson, V., Perlman, R., Reiher, P., Schulman, J., Su, X. and Zhou, W. (2017) ‘Understanding the Mirai botnet’, in Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Security Symposium. Berkeley: USENIX Association, pp. 1093–1110.
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (2022) Shields Up: Technical Guidance. Washington, DC: CISA.
Duelfer, C. (2004) Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency.
European Commission (2018) Communication on Tackling Online Disinformation: A European Approach. COM(2018) 236 final. Brussels: European Commission.
European External Action Service (2023) Annual Report on the Implementation of the EU’s Eastern Partnership Policy. Brussels: EEAS.
European Union (2022) Regulation (EU) 2022/2065 of the European Parliament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act). Official Journal of the European Union, L 277.
Federal Aviation Administration (2023) NOTAM System Outage: Timeline and Root Cause Analysis. Washington, DC: FAA.
Federal Aviation Administration (2025) Statement on Flight Volume Reductions During Government Shutdown. Washington, DC: FAA.
Federal Bureau of Investigation (2021) Colonial Pipeline Ransomware Attack: Statement. Washington, DC: FBI.
Fitts, C. A. and Skidmore, M. (2017) What Led to the Discovery of $21 Trillion in Unauthorized Federal Spending? Solari Report. Langley, WA: Solari.
Herman, E. S. and Chomsky, N. (1988) Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media. New York: Pantheon Books.
Human Rights Watch (2023) Nova Kakhovka Dam Destruction: Civilian Impact Assessment. New York: HRW.
International Atomic Energy Agency (2018) Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231. Vienna: IAEA.
International Committee of the Red Cross (1977) Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). Geneva: ICRC.
Italian Senate (2000) Report of the Parliamentary Inquiry into the Stragi and Terrorism in Italy. Rome: Senato della Repubblica.
Klein, N. (2007) The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan Books.
National Intelligence Council (2007) National Intelligence Estimate: Iran’s Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. Washington, DC: NIC.
National Security Agency (2005) Gulf of Tonkin Incident: Declassified Signals Intelligence Reports. Fort Meade: NSA.
Rowse, T. (1991) ‘The Nayirah testimony: Anatomy of a fabrication’, The New Republic, 14 January.
Schmitt, C. (1922) Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. Berlin: Duncker and Humblot (English edition: Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (2004) Report on the U.S. Intelligence Community’s Prewar Intelligence Assessments on Iraq. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (2025) Trends in International Arms Transfers and Military Expenditure. Stockholm: SIPRI.
United States Naval Forces Central Command (2026) Force Posture Statement. Manama: NAVCENT.
Webb, W. (2022) One Nation Under Blackmail, Volume 1: The Sordid Union Between Intelligence and Organized Crime That Gave Birth to Jeffrey Epstein. Walterville, OR: TrineDay.
Webb, W. (2022) One Nation Under Blackmail, Volume 2: The Sordid Union Between Intelligence and Crime That Gave Birth to Jeffrey Epstein. Walterville, OR: TrineDay.
Wu, T. (2016) The Attention Merchants: The Epic Scramble to Get Inside Our Heads. New York: Knopf

Leave a Reply