Global geopolitics

Sharpening nuclear deterrence and revising doctrine as necessary conditions to defeat Kiev and constrain the West

The post-Cold War order has failed, and Russia’s survival now depends on forcing a strategic reversal of Western escalation through nuclear-backed coercive deterrence rather than conventional victory. The collapse of the Soviet Union removed geopolitical constraints without eliminating nuclear parity, creating a delayed systemic conflict in which Western expansion and Russian deterrence became structurally incompatible. Sergey Karaganov defines the present condition without ambiguity: “A full-scale world war has already begun.” The empirical reality follows directly. A nuclear-armed state confronts encroachment by a materially superior coalition that assumes escalation can be contained below existential thresholds.

Scale removes any residual ambiguity about the nature of this confrontation. NATO economies collectively exceed $40 trillion in output, while Russia operates under sustained sanctions targeting finance, energy, and technology sectors. Yet material asymmetry fails to produce decisive advantage because nuclear parity neutralises conventional superiority while geography anchors Russian defence depth. Independent military analysts, including Jacques Baud, estimate Ukrainian losses in the hundreds of thousands, with infrastructure degradation across eastern regions exceeding one third of total capacity. This scale of attrition between nuclear powers has no modern precedent. Karaganov’s conclusion follows with precision: Russia has been “drawn into a war of attrition under imposed rules,” a structure designed to exhaust its capacity while constraining escalation.

Strategic execution since 2014 reveals failure rooted in misaligned assumptions rather than operational weakness. Russian policy relied on limited coercion combined with negotiated stabilisation, particularly through the Minsk agreements. Western actors used the same framework to expand Ukrainian military capacity and integrate it into NATO-compatible structures. Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel later confirmed that Minsk served to “buy time for Ukraine.” Russian strategy failed because it treated negotiation as stabilisation while the West treated it as preparation. Russia did not lose initiative militarily; it ceded it strategically by accepting the adversary’s framework. Karaganov identifies the deeper error with clarity: Moscow misidentified Ukraine as the adversary, when the operative opponent remained “the collective West,” whose objective extended beyond containment to strategic defeat.

Economic warfare has evolved into a structural contest over global order rather than a supplementary pressure mechanism. Sanctions aimed at isolating Russia accelerated fragmentation of the international financial system, particularly through expansion of national currency settlements across Eurasia. Economist Michael Hudson notes that “sanctions drive countries to create alternatives,” a dynamic now visible in the erosion of dollar-centric trade mechanisms. The weaponisation of the dollar accelerated its erosion as a neutral reserve instrument. European economies absorbed severe energy cost shocks following disruption of Russian gas flows, weakening industrial competitiveness across core sectors. The United States increased energy exports and capital inflows, reinforcing Karaganov’s assertion that Washington “continues to profit from the war while effectively plundering the Europeans.” Sanctions did not isolate Russia; they accelerated the breakdown of the Western-controlled economic system.

The conflict has shifted from a deterrence equilibrium to an escalation game under incomplete information. Russia, the United States, and the European NATO bloc constitute the primary players, while Ukraine functions as an operational proxy rather than an autonomous strategic actor. Russia evaluates outcomes in existential terms, whereas the United States seeks strategic weakening without direct confrontation, and Europe absorbs disproportionate exposure under alliance constraints. The equilibrium shifted when Western actors concluded escalation would remain below the nuclear threshold, converting deterrence into an invitation for pressure. Western elites “constantly insist that Russia will never resort to nuclear weapons,” as Karaganov observes, thereby lowering perceived costs of continued escalation. Deterrence without credibility becomes provocation.

Karaganov’s framework seeks to destroy this equilibrium by reintroducing uncertainty into escalation outcomes. Classical deterrence theory, as articulated by Thomas Schelling, depends on credible risk rather than declared limits. Russia’s prior restraint reduced perceived escalation probability, enabling calibrated Western pressure. Restoring deterrence requires altering payoff structures through credible threats that extend beyond the battlefield. Karaganov therefore argues for readiness to strike “American and Western European assets overseas, including those located in third countries,” exploiting systemic vulnerabilities embedded within Western global infrastructure. The West escalates because it assumes Russia will not. That assumption is the centre of the war.

A decisive extension of this doctrine lies in the deliberate targeting of elite insulation. Karaganov rejects the premise that deterrence can function while adversarial leadership remains physically and psychologically insulated from consequences. He proposes including “locations where elite decision-makers are concentrated” within potential targeting frameworks. “The illusion that political elites can hide must be dispelled.” This transforms deterrence into a direct mechanism for destabilising Western decision-making structures. Political systems become risk-averse when leadership security is directly threatened, and coercive pressure shifts from battlefield attrition to internal constraint.

Pre-emptive and asymmetric strike logic further restructures the conflict from reactive deterrence to compellence. Karaganov advocates prioritising non-nuclear strikes against command centres, communications networks, and logistical infrastructure, escalating only if necessary. This approach targets the operational nervous system of Western power rather than its proxies. Hypersonic delivery systems compress response time and increase uncertainty, reinforcing deterrence credibility through speed and unpredictability. Andrei Martyanov describes this shift as “qualitative superiority in strategic strike capability,” enabling Russia to impose risk disproportionate to its economic scale. The battlefield is secondary; perception is decisive.

The abandonment of arms control frameworks forms a necessary component of this recalibration. Karaganov states that “the issue of a new START treaty must be closed,” rejecting agreements that constrain flexibility without resolving underlying competition. The abandonment of arms control is not rejection of stability; it is rejection of a stability that advantages the adversary. Predictability, once treated as stabilising, becomes a liability when it enables incremental escalation under fixed thresholds. The proposal to resume nuclear testing functions as a costly signal, reinforcing credibility by demonstrating readiness and technological reliability.

Emerging technologies intensify the urgency of doctrinal revision. The proliferation of drones and distributed strike systems lowers the threshold for continuous conflict, enabling persistent low-level attacks that erode deterrence boundaries. Karaganov insists that these systems must be re-integrated into a nuclear-backed deterrence framework, ensuring that even limited actions carry strategic consequences. Those responsible for such attacks “must understand that retaliation will be unavoidable,” re-establishing escalation linkage between tactical and strategic domains.

Institutional coherence becomes essential under these conditions. Karaganov proposes the appointment of a unified commander for the European theatre, consolidating authority across conventional and nuclear operations. Fragmented command structures dilute escalation signalling and undermine deterrence credibility. Centralised command ensures alignment between military execution and strategic objectives, enabling controlled escalation within a coherent framework.

A profound doctrinal reversal underpins these measures. Post-Cold War orthodoxy asserted that nuclear war could not produce winners, thereby removing it from practical strategy. Karaganov rejects this premise directly: “It is time to reconsider the notion that nuclear war can have no winners.” This does not imply pursuit of nuclear conflict but restoration of credible threat perception. Denial of escalation possibilities encourages risk-taking by adversaries operating under false assumptions of safety.

Three decades of NATO expansion rested on the assumption that Russia would not escalate beyond conventional limits. That assumption has collapsed. What was treated as uncontested expansion is now recognised as strategic overreach. European rearmament reflects belated recognition of vulnerability while reintroducing historical risks associated with continental militarisation. Karaganov’s warning regarding Germany underscores this continuity, linking present dynamics to structural patterns that produced earlier global conflicts.

Systemic consequences extend far beyond the European theatre. Strategic alignment between Russia and China consolidates an alternative centre of power combining industrial capacity, resource security, and military capability. This alignment reduces Western leverage across multiple regions, particularly within the Global South, where states increasingly resist participation in sanction regimes. The Ukraine war functions not as a regional conflict but as the mechanism through which global power is redistributed. The unipolar system has not adapted; it is being replaced.

Future dynamics depend on whether deterrence recalibration successfully alters Western risk perception. Continued escalation without recalibration guarantees systemic collision. Rational actors will seek to avoid existential conflict, yet misperception remains the critical variable. The conflict will end only when escalation risk exceeds Western willingness to continue. The war will not be decided in Ukraine; it will be decided in the perception of risk within Western decision-making systems.

Karaganov’s concept of defeating the West operates across multiple domains simultaneously. Military operations, economic restructuring, doctrinal revision, and psychological pressure converge into a single objective: forcing the West to abandon escalation by altering its cost-benefit calculus, undermining its structural advantages, and exposing its internal vulnerabilities. Victory is not defined by territorial control but by compelled strategic retreat under unacceptable risk conditions.

A system built on unipolar dominance cannot compel a nuclear-armed adversary that is willing to escalate beyond imposed limits. Under those conditions, coercive stabilisation through controlled risk escalation becomes the decisive mechanism of outcome, and the structure of the emerging order will be determined by the actor capable of imposing systemic vulnerability at acceptable risk to itself.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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