Why BRICS is moving toward maritime cooperation and why it has not become a military alliance
Cooperation between the navies of member countries would help protect sea lanes, Nikolay Patrushev has said,speaking to Argumenty i Fakty (meaning “arguements and facts” ), a Russian weekly newspaper.
‘Our key task is building a multipolar order at sea. Russia and its partners conduct naval exercises to protect trade routes and secure global maritime stability’, he further stated.
The call by Nikolay Patrushev for a full strategic maritime dimension to BRICS is not happening in a vacuum, and reflects a widening perception among several member states that Western military, financial and political pressure is no longer episodic but structural.
Over the past few years, senior US lawmakers such as Marco Rubio and Lindsey Graham have openly framed China, Russia and aligned powers as adversarial blocs that must be countered across economic, technological and military domains. The language coming from parts of Washington is not about coexistence inside a plural system. It is about maintaining primacy and supremacy. Sanctions regimes have expanded and secondary sanctions now target third parties. Naval deployments reinforce chokepoint dominance, whilst financial tools are weaponised. From Moscow’s and Beijing’s perspective, this looks less like competition and more like containment.
The maritime domain is central to this dynamic. Roughly 80-90% of global trade moves by sea. Energy exporters within BRICS rely on tanker routes that pass through Western-influenced waters, insurance markets, and payment systems. When tankers are seized or sanctioned, that translates to control of sea lanes equaling leverage over sovereign economies. That leverage can be used to coerce policy change, pressure currencies, or destabilize governments already under economic strain.
However, If Western capitals increasingly treat BRICS countries as systemic challengers, and if tools of pressure include sanctions, naval interdictions, financial isolation and support for political opposition movements, then fragmentation inside BRICS becomes a vulnerability. A divided grouping is easier to pressure state by state. A coordinated one is harder to isolate.
There is historical memory here as well. Many BRICS members are post-colonial states. The rhetoric of “rules-based order” can be interpreted by some political elites as selective enforcement of rules written without them. When Western officials speak of reshaping supply chains away from China, weakening Russia strategically, or using economic pressure to alter domestic behavior in emerging powers, it reinforces suspicions that what is being defended is not neutral law but hierarchy.
From that vantage point, deeper coordination, including maritime, appears not aggressive but defensive. It is about strategic insulation. Shared naval drills, alternative payment systems, energy trading outside the dollar, development banks outside Bretton Woods institutions, these are mechanisms to reduce exposure.
So why not formalise this into a military alliance if the pressure is systemic? Perhaps, because even under pressure, threat perceptions are not identical. China views US containment in the Pacific as its primary strategic concern. Russia’s central confrontation is in Eastern Europe and the Arctic. India’s immediate security calculus still includes China itself. Brazil’s strategic horizon is the South Atlantic and domestic development. South Africa’s concerns are regional stability and economic resilience. Even if all perceive Western pressure, they do not perceive it at the same intensity or in the same form.
A formal military alliance requires automaticity, that an attack on one triggers a response from all. That demands synchronised threat assessment and willingness to enter wars not directly linked to one’s own core interests. BRICS has not reached that point. Some members calculate that hedging, maintaining economic ties with the West while building alternatives, provides more flexibility than locking into a bloc confrontation.
There is also risk calculus. The moment BRICS declares itself a military alliance, it confirms Western hawkish narratives of a consolidated anti-Western axis. That could accelerate military build-ups, sanctions coordination and diplomatic isolation. Some members may judge that loose strategic coordination preserves ambiguity, and ambiguity slows escalation.
We are entering a dystopian period and very high chances of an potential inflection point. If Western policy continues to treat BRICS states as a unified adversarial camp regardless of their internal differences, through synchronised tariffs, sanctions, technology denial, military encirclement and political pressure, then the cost of non-alignment within BRICS rises. At some threshold, fragmentation may become more dangerous than consolidation.
In that scenario, maritime cooperation becomes the first layer of collective security: protecting trade routes, coordinating naval presence, deterring interdictions. It stops short of a treaty alliance but builds interoperability and political trust. Over time, sustained external pressure could compress strategic differences inside the bloc.
The core tension is that BRICS unity is strategically rational under sustained external pressure, but formal militarisation carries escalation risks and internal contradictions. For now, the bloc is walking a middle path, deepening coordination without crossing into treaty-bound alliance. Whether that remains viable depends less on BRICS rhetoric and more on how aggressively the Western military and financial architecture moves against its members.
Authored By: Global GeoPolitics
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