global geopolitics

Editorial Analysis | September 2026

The collapse of the Soviet Union produced a distribution of global power that left Washington in effective control of the international system. That concentration of power, combined with the desire to maintain it in perpetuity, created structural incentives that shaped American foreign policy for three decades. One side emerged from the Cold War with scraps while the other enjoyed unchallenged dominance and became what its defenders described as a benign hegemon. John Mearsheimer has argued that NATO did not perceive Russia as a threat after 1991 and expanded under the assumption that it meant no harm. That expansion proceeded on the principle that the West could do whatever it wanted because no one possessed the capacity to stop it. The arrangement worked as long as the other side remained too weak to challenge it.

Three decades of Western dominance produced a distinctive set of material advantages that Western elites came to regard as permanent features of the international order. Cheap energy flowed from the Persian Gulf and Russia itself, open markets absorbed Western exports, and no rival possessed the capacity to challenge American preferences. The West built alliances according to its own calculations, bombed adversaries according to its own timetables, and sanctioned governments according to its own criteria. NATO expanded to Russia’s borders, Yugoslavia was dismembered, Iraq was invaded, Libya was destroyed, and sanctions were imposed on any government that refused to accept the parameters of Western policy. These actions proceeded without serious challenge because no actor possessed the military, economic, or institutional capacity to mount effective resistance.

The 1990s represented a period of unprecedented humiliation and collapse for Russia, with poverty, loss of influence, and the disintegration of state capacity producing a national trauma that shaped subsequent policy. Western policymakers observed that collapse and drew conclusions that reinforced their assumptions about the permanence of unipolarity. They did not anticipate that Russia would recover, and they did not prepare for a world in which Russia could push back against Western preferences. The comfortable world that Western elites built only worked because nobody could challenge it, and the realisation that this condition was temporary rather than permanent has produced a crisis of strategic confidence.

Russia’s recovery has invalidated the assumptions that underpinned three decades of Western policy and exposed the structural fragility of the unipolar order. The money pumping into Ukraine feels existential to Western policymakers because it is fundamentally about stopping Russia before the unipolar moment ends completely. The rhetoric of democracy, values, and Ukrainian freedom serves as public justification for a policy that is driven by institutional incentives and strategic calculations. If Russia survives the current confrontation and emerges stronger, the West returns to a world where it must negotiate rather than dictate, where it cannot simply do whatever it wants, and where someone can actually say no. After thirty years of being the only superpower, that prospect generates more anxiety among Western elites than any other outcome.

The NATO bombing of Yugoslavia in 1999 represented a moment when Russia was too weak to intervene and could only observe as Western power was exercised without constraint. The contrast between that moment and the present situation illustrates the extent of structural change in the international system. Russia can now push back against Western pressure, and Western policymakers are realising that the comfortable world they built only worked because nobody could challenge it. The desperate escalation that characterises current Western policy represents not strength but panic about what comes next. The structural pressures driving confrontation with Russia are rooted in the recognition that unipolarity is ending and that the institutional interests that profited from it face an uncertain future.

The political economy of Western media and policy institutions has systematically marginalised realist analysis while promoting interventionist consensus. Mainstream journalistic impartiality operates within parameters established by state and financial oligarchies that manufacture consent for policies serving imperial requirements. Corporate media networks do not function as neutral arbiters of truth but as institutions embedded within systems of power that shape the boundaries of acceptable discourse. The exclusion of dissenting perspectives from mainstream platforms reflects not editorial judgment but structural incentives that reward conformity with institutional consensus. Counter-hegemonic analysts who challenge prevailing assumptions face marginalisation, ridicule, and professional exclusion, while those who defend interventionist policies receive access, funding, and institutional support.

John Quincy Adams warned that an interventionist foreign policy and the pursuit of global domination would pervert America’s character and insensibly change it from liberty to force. Adams further warned that while America might become the dictatress of the world, she would no longer be the ruler of her own spirit. The intervening centuries have confirmed his assessment, as the pursuit of empire has transformed American domestic institutions, corrupted political processes, and concentrated power in unaccountable agencies. The end of the American empire will be good for the world and more importantly for the American people, though the transition will impose costs on the institutional interests that have profited from perpetual confrontation.

The strategic chain from decision to consequence reveals that Western policy has failed by its own stated metrics. The objective of NATO expansion was to extend Western influence and prevent the emergence of a rival power bloc, but the result has been the consolidation of Russian resistance and the emergence of a multipolar order that challenges Western preferences. The objective of sanctions was to cripple Russian economic capacity and force political change, but the result has been the diversification of Russian trade relationships and the acceleration of de-dollarisation. The objective of supporting Ukraine was to demonstrate Western resolve and deter future challenges, but the result has been the exposure of Western military industrial limitations and the erosion of credibility. The original objectives have not been achieved, and the strategic consequences have been the opposite of those intended.

The counterargument that Western military superiority can still produce favourable outcomes requires serious examination. Western military capability remains substantial, but the possession of advanced weapons does not automatically translate into strategic success when the adversary possesses the will to absorb costs and impose costs in return. The historical record demonstrates that material superiority has repeatedly failed against determined resistance when geography, will, and strategic depth favour the weaker party. The American experience in Vietnam, the Soviet experience in Afghanistan, and the Western experience in Iraq and Afghanistan all demonstrate that technological superiority cannot compensate for deficiencies in political will and strategic coherence. The Russian campaign in Ukraine has revealed similar limitations in Western military industrial capacity, with sanctions failing to prevent Russian production and Western stockpiles depleting faster than replacements can be manufactured.

The future trajectory of the confrontation remains uncertain because multiple plausible outcomes remain possible. The West could escalate further and accept higher costs and greater risks without any guarantee of success. The West could withdraw and accept the consequences of a diminished presence and a reordered regional architecture. The West could negotiate and accept that the world has changed and that the ability to impose outcomes has limits. The evidence suggests that the current trajectory is unsustainable because Western publics are increasingly unwilling to bear the costs of confrontation and Western military industrial capacity cannot sustain the current tempo of operations indefinitely. Whether Western political leadership recognises this reality remains to be seen in the coming months.

The end of unipolarity will produce a more complex international order in which multiple powers contest influence and no single actor can dictate outcomes. That order will require the United States to abandon the habits of dominance and to accept the constraints of negotiation. It will require American leaders to recognise that the pursuit of global domination has corrupted domestic institutions and eroded the liberties that Adams warned would be sacrificed. It will require a fundamental reorientation of American foreign policy away from intervention and toward restraint. The only group who will suffer from this transition will be the power-mad liars, thieves, and sociopaths in Washington who have profited from perpetual confrontation. The American people will benefit from the end of empire, and the world will benefit from the restoration of a more balanced international order.

Authored By: Global GeoPolitics

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References

Clinton, W. J. (1997) A National Security Strategy for a New Century. Washington, DC: The White House. Available at: https://clintonwhitehouse3.archives.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/nsc-2.html (Accessed: 13 September 2026).

Adams, J. Q. (1821) Speech to the U.S. House of Representatives on Foreign Policy, 4 July 1821. Charlottesville, VA: Miller Center, University of Virginia. Available at: https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches/july-4-1821-speech-us-house-representatives-foreign-policy (Accessed: 13 September 2026).

Mearsheimer, J. J. (1993) ‘The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear Deterrent’, Foreign Affairs, 72(3), pp. 50–66. Available at: https://www.jstor.org/stable/20045620 (Accessed: 13 September 2026).

Mearsheimer, J. J. (2014) ‘Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin’, Foreign Affairs, 93(5), pp. 77–89. Available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault (Accessed: 13 September 2026).

Trenin, D. (2026) ‘A Multipolar World: From Ideology to Design’, Russian International Affairs Council, 30 April. Available at: https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/a-multipolar-world-from-ideology-to-design/ (Accessed: 13 September 2026).

Secondary and Analytical Sources

Abrahms, M. (2023) ‘Ignoring International Relations Scholars is Leading the US to Mistakes on Ukraine’, History News Network, 7 March. Available at: https://www.historynewsnetwork.org/article/ignoring-international-relations-scholars-is-leadi (Accessed: 13 September 2026).

Glaser, J. (2026) ‘By the sword: America was born intervening’, Responsible Statecraft, 30 June. Available at: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/america-interventionist-origins/ (Accessed: 13 September 2026).

China Daily (2025) ‘Ukraine crisis a lesson for the West’, China Daily, 24 May. Available at: https://mobile.chinadaily.com.cn/cn/html5/2025-05/24/content_004_6830f3b5ed50ccabe1512b14.htm (Accessed: 13 September 2026).

Russia Matters (2026) ‘A Multipolar World: From Ideology to Design’, Russia Matters, 30 April. Available at: https://www.russiamatters.org/news-digest-section (Accessed: 13 September 2026).